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1. This is the first part of a two-part Article.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer... to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 2
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer... It] o fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, disability, marital status, or national origin .... 3
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer... [tIo fail
or refuse to hire, or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to such individual's compensa-
tion, terms, advancement potential, conditions, or privileges of
employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, disabil-
ity, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, or receipt of public assist-
ance....4
An employer in Lincoln, Nebraska, who discharges a person
from employment because of her race violates at least5 three laws.6
The federal,7 state,8 and local9 governments all prohibit employ-
ment discrimination based on race. As the excerpts above indi-
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1976).
3. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1104(1) (1978).
4. LINcoLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.08.040(a) (1980).
5. There are a number of laws prohibiting employment discrimination. See, e.g.,
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976); Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976); Vocational Re-
habilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-774 (1976); Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); Act Prohibiting Unjust Discrimination in
Employment Because of Age, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1001 to 48-1009 (1978 &
Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1219 to 48-1227 (1978) (the Nebraska Equal
Pay Act). The simple example cited in the text may violate laws in addition
to the comprehensive employment discrimination laws cited above. See, e.g.,
Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). This Article, though, will fo-
cus on the procedural interrelationship of the comprehensive laws at the fed-
eral, state, and local levels.
6. This assumes, of course, that the other requisites of the respective laws have
been met. It assumes, for example, that the employer falls within the defini-
tion of "employer" in each law and that a charge of discrimination has been
filed in a timely manner.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976)
[hereinafter referred to as Title VII].
8. Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1101 to 48-
1126 (1978 & Supp. 1982) [hereinafter referred to as Nebraska FEPA].
9. LiNcoLN, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 11.01.010 to 11.01.070, 11.08.010 to 11.08.180 (1980)
[hereinafter referred to as Lincoln FEPO]. Omaha and Grand Island also
have local ordinances which prohibit employment discrimination based on
race. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 13-81 to 13-98, 13-116 to 13-222 (1980) [here-
inafter referred to as Omaha FEPO]; GRAND ISLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 37-1
to 37-4, 37-7 to 37-23 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Grand Island FEPO].
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cate,10 the substantive provisions of these laws are virtually
identical." The procedures for enforcing the provisions, however,
are quite different. The federal law, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,12 provides for initial review of employment discrimina-
tion charges by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and for ultimate resolution in a federal district court.13
The state law, the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA),14 pro-
vides for initial investigation by the Nebraska Equal Opportunity
Commission (NEOC), a public hearing before an administrative
hearing officer, and review by the NEOC and the courts.' 5 The lo-
cal ordinance in Lincoln' 6 allows charges to be heard in state
10. See s-upra text accompanying notes 2-4. See also OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE
§ 13-89 (1980); GRAND IsLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-7.1(a) (1980).
11. The following chart facilitates a comparison of the other substantive provi-
sions of Title VII, Nebraska FEPA, Omaha FEPO, Lincoln FEPO, and Grand
Island FEPO:
Substantive
Provision Title viJa  Nebraskab Omahac Lincolnd Grand Islande




Illegal employment 2000e-2(b) 48-1105 13-90 11.08.050 37-7.2
agency practices
Illegal labor 2000e-2(c) 48-1106 13-91 11.08.060 37-7.3
organization practices
Illegal apprenticeship 200e-2(d) 48-1107 13-92 11.08.070 *
or training programs
BFOQ and educational 200e-2(e) 48-1108 13-95 to 11.08.080 37-7.4
institutions exceptions 13-97
Communist Party 200e-2(f) 48-1109 * * *
exception
National security 2000e-2(g) 48-1110 * 11.08.090 *
exception
Seniority and merit 2000e-2(h) 48-1111 13-95(C) 11.08.100 13-7.5
exceptions
Preferential treatment 2000e-2(j) 48-1113 * 11.08.110 37-7.6
Retaliation 2000e-3(a) 48-1114 13-116 11.08.120 *
Notices and 2000e-3(b) 48-1115 13-93 11.08.130 *
publications
a All citations refer to sections of Title VIL
b All citations refer to sections of Nebraska FEPA.
c All citations refer to sections of Omaha FEPO.
d All citations refer to sections of Lincoln FEPO.
e All citations refer to sections of Grand Island FEPO.
* No comparable provision.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
13. Title VII, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
14. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1101 to 48-1126 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
15. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1118 to 48-1120 (1978 & Supp. 1982); Rules 2-8, NEOC, 6
NEB. ADMIN. R. 2-1 to 8-1 (1977).
16. LINcoLN, NEB., MuN. CODE §§ 11.01.010 to 11.02.090, 11.08.010 to 11.08.180 (1980).
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court'7 or before the Lincoln Human Rights Commission.18 Thus,
the evidentiary hearing on a charge of employment discrimination
may be held before any of a number of persons: a federal judge, a
state judge, an administrative hearing officer, or a local fair em-
ployment practices commission.
Despite this procedural variety, the laws barely touch upon,19
and certainly do not adequately explain,20 the interrelationship of
the procedures. As a result, a procedural labyrinth worthy of
Daedalus has been created which, at times, protects the Minotaur
of discrimination.21 This Article is intended to be a golden thread
to aid the passage of Nebraska attorneys into and out of the proce-
dural labyrinth. Although the Article will necessarily refer to the
substantive provisions of the employment discrimination laws ap-
plicable in Nebraska, the focus will be on procedures.
The Article will appear in two parts.2 2 Part One begins by
describing the procedural provisions of the state and local fair em-
ployment practices laws in Nebraska. It then discusses the inter-
relationship of those laws. Part Two will first describe the
procedural provisions of Title VII and discuss its interrelationship
with the state and local laws. The Article will then conclude by
17. LiNcoLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.01.030 (1980).
18. LINcoLN, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 11.02.060 to 11.02.070 (1980).
19. See Title VII, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976); Rule 2-2(d), NEOC, 6 NEB. AD-
aNN. R. 2-2(d), 2-4 (1977).
20. See infra notes 138-55 and accompanying text.
21. And Minos duly paid his vows to Jove,
A hundred bulls, on landing, and in the palace
Hung up the spoils of war, but in his household
Shame had grown big, and the hybrid monster-offspring
Revealed his queen's adultery, and Minos
Contrived to hide this specimen in a maze,
A labyrinth built by Daedalus, an artist
Famous in building, who could set in stone
Confusion and conflict, and decieve the eye
With devious aisles and passages. As Maeander
Plays in the Phrygian fields, a doubtful river,
Flowing and looping back and sends its waters
Either to source or sea, so Daedalus
Made those innumerable windings wander,
And hardly found his own way out again,
Through the deceptive twistings of that prison.
Here Minos shot the Minotaur, and fed him
Twice, each nine years, on tribute claimed from Athens,
Blood of that city's youth. But the third tribute
Ended the rite forever. Ariadne,
For Theseus' sake, supplied the clue, the thread
Of gold, to unwind the maze which no one ever
Had entered and left ....
OVID, METAMORPHOSES 186-87 (R. Humphries trans. 1955).
22. Part Two will appear in Volume 62, Number 4 of the Nebraska Law Review.
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considering procedural strategy in employment discrimination
cases in Nebraska.
II. STATE AND LOCAL PROCEDURES
Nebraska did not lead the country into a new era of equal em-
ployment opportunity. The Nebraska Legislature failed to pass
fair employment practice bills introduced in 1959, 1961, and 1963.23
In 1964, the Nebraska Supreme Court held Omaha's fair employ-
ment practices law unconstitutional because it related to a matter
"of statewide and not of local concern." 24 So as matters stood in
1964, local governments could not act in the area and state govern-
ment would not act. The Nebraska FEPA was finally enacted into
law in 1965,25 partly out of fear that Nebraska would eventually be
the only state in the Union without a state fair employment prac-
tices law.26
Despite this inauspicious beginning, the statewide antidis-
crimination effort has grown to include three local ordinances, as
well as the state law. Omaha, Lincoln, and Grand Island have ordi-
nances that prohibit employment discrimination. 2 7 This section
will describe and discuss the procedures of the four antidis-
crimination laws in Nebraska.
23. 1963 NEB. LEGIS. J. 197, 2017; 1961 NEB. LEGIS. J. 323, 1522; 1959 NEB. LEGIS. J.
26, 1363.
24. Midwest Employers Council, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 877, 886, 131
N.W.2d 609, 616 (1964). See also City of Omaha Human Relations Dep't v. City
Wide Rock Excavation Co., 201 Neb. 405, 408, 268 N.W.2d 98, 101 (1978). The
Nebraska Unicameral has since passed legislation authorizing municipalities
to enact fair employment practices ordinances and counties to adopt fair em-
ployment practices resolutions which are "substantially equivalent to" or
"more comprehensive than" the state laws on the subject. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 20-113 (Supp. 1982). See also NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1724, 20-113.01 (Supp.
1982). Despite this clear statutory language, there still is some doubt about
the authority of local governments to enact fair employment practices laws
which are more comprehensive than state law, for example, to enact laws
which prohibit employment discrimination because of a person's sexual pref-
erences. Opinion letter of Lincoln City Att'y (Nov. 4, 1981) (on file with the
Nebraska Law Review) (City of Lincoln cannot include sexual preference as
a protected class under Lincoln FEPO); Opinion letter from Ass't Att'y Gen.,
Dale B. Brodkey to State Sen. David Landis (Dec. 14, 1981) (on fie with the
Nebraska Law Review). Although a full discussion of the issue is beyond the
scope of this Article, the better view is that local governments do have such
authority. Compare ch. 120, § 9, 1969 Neb. Laws 544 with LB 681, § 1, 1974
Neb. Laws 434.
25. 1965 Neb. Laws 782, 798 (codified at NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-1101 to 48-1121 (1978
& Supp. 1982).
26. Floor debate on LB 656, at 1989 (June 14, 1965) (statement of Sen. Mahoney)
(copy on file with the Nebraska Law Review). See infra notes 195-97 and
accompanying text.




All of the Nebraska laws prohibit employment discrimination
because of a person's race, color, religion, sex, disability, marital
status, or national origin.28 The local ordinances, in addition, pro-
hibit age discrimination in employment;2 9 the state also bans age
discrimination in employment, but the restriction is not included
in the Nebraska FEPA.30 The Omaha and Grand Island ordi-
nances also prohibit employment discrimination because of a per-
son's creed;31 the Lincoln and Grand Island ordinances prohibit
employment discrimination because of a person's ancestry;32 and
the Lincoln ordinance prohibits employment discrimination be-
cause a person receives public assistance.33 Every Nebraska law,
then, contains broader prohibitions than those in Title V1I,3 but
on the other hand the prohibitions are narrower than those con-
tained in some employment discrimination laws.35
The prohibitions of all the Nebraska laws apply to employers,36
labor organizations,3 7 and employment agencies.38 The definitions
28. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1104 to 48-1106 (1978); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 13-89
to 13-94 (1980); LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.08.010 (1980); GRAND ISLAND,
NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 37-7.1 to 37-7.3 (1981).
29. See the local ordinances cited, supra note 28.
30. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1001 to 48-1009 (1978 & Supp. 1982). The procedures
of the Nebraska age discrimination statute and the federal age discrimination
statute, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (Supp. II 1978), are beyond the scope of this
Article.
31. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 13-89 to 13-94 (1980); GRAND ISLAND, NEB., MUN.
CODE §§ 37-7.1 to 37-7.3 (1981).
32. LINcoLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.08.010 (1980); GRAND ISLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE
§§ 37-7.1 to 37-7.3 (1981).
33. LINcOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.08.010 (1980).
34. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based upon a person's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Title VII, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(1976). The Supreme Court has recently held that state and local antidis-
crimination laws are preempted to the extent they provide broader protection
than Title VII and apply to "employee benefit plans" regulated by the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1144(a)
(1976). Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983).
35. [It is illegal to discriminate in employment] because of [an] individ-
ual's sex, race, religion, color, national origin or ancestry, age, handi-
cap, marital status, source of income, arrest record or conviction
record, less than honorable discharge, physical appearance, sexual
orientation, political beliefs or the fact that such person is a student.
MADISON, WIS., MUN. CODE § 3.23(7) (a) (1979).
36. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1102(2), 48-1104 (1978 & Supp. 1982); OMAHA, NEB., MUN.
CODE §§ 13-88(C), 13-89 (1980); LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 11.01.010(h),
11.08.040 (1980); GRAND ISLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 37-3(i), 37-7.1 (1981). See
1965-66 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 281.
37. NEs. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1102(3), 48-1106 (1978 & Supp. 1982); OMAHA, NEB., MUN.
CODE §§ 13-88(E), 13-91 (1980); LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 11.01.010(1),
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of employer, however, differ considerably.3 9 The Nebraska FEPA
covers employers with fifteen or more employees,40 the Omaha
Fair Employment Practices Ordinance (FEPO) covers employers
with six or more employees, 41 the Lincoln FEPO covers employers
with four or more employees,4 2 and the Grand Island FEPO covers
all employers. 43
B. The Charge
The antidiscrimination procedures all begin with the filing of a
charge44 with a fair employment practices agency 45 or officer.4 All
11.08.060 (1980); GRAND ISLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 37-3(j), 37-7.3 (1981). See
1965-66 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 281.
38. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1102(4), 48-1105 (1978 & Supp. 1982); OMAHA, NEB., MUN.
CODE §§ 13-88(D), 13-90 (1980); LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 11.01.010(i),
11.08.050 (1980); GRAND ISLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 37-3(k), 37-7.2 (1981).
39. This Article will not consider a multitude of coverage issues that might arise.
It will not, for example, consider problems in determining (1) what the term
"employer" means, see, e.g., Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389
(8th Cir. 1977) (related employers may be grouped together to meet requisite
number of employees); Pascutoi v. Washburn-McReavy Mortuary, Inc., 10
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,441 (D. Minn. 1975) (part-time employees should
be counted in determining whether employer employs requisite number of
employees); Omaha Pub. Schools v. Hall, 211 Neb. 618, 319 N.W.2d 730 (1982)
(considers whether political subdivisions are employers under the Nebraska
FEPA); (2) what types of employment relationships are covered, see, e.g.,
Hishan v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982) (Title VII does not
apply to law firm's decisions regarding partnership); 1979-80 Op. Neb. Att'y
Gen. 283 (independent contractors are not protected by the Nebraska FEPA);
(3) what the term "employment agency" means, see, e.g., Kaplowitz v. Univ.
of Chicago, 387 F. Supp. 42 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (placement office of the University
of Chicago Law School was an employment agency under Title VII); Brush v.
San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., 315 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1970), afd
mem., 469 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973) (newspapers
are not employment agencies under Title VII); or (4) the scope of the pro-
tected classes, see, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (dis-
crimination based on citizenship is not national origin discrimination under
Title VII); Richards v. Omaha Public Schools, 194 Neb. 463, 232 N.W.2d 29
(1975) (pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination under the Ne-
braska FEPA); 1977-78 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 55 (discrimination against homo-
sexuals is not sex discrimination under the Nebraska FEPA).
40. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-1102(4), 48-1105 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
41. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 13-88(D), 13-90 (1980). It should be noted that the
Omaha FEPO definition of employer lacks precision and may lead to jurisdic-
tional issues with respect to employers that have a fluctuating number of
employees.
42. LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 11.01.010(i), 11.08.050 (1980).
43. GRAND IsLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 37-3(K), 37-7.2 (1981).
44. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1118(2) (Supp. 1982); Rule 2-1(g), NEOC, 6 NEB. ADMIN.
R. 2-2 (1977); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 13-134 (1980); LINCOLN, NEB., MUN.
CODE § 11.02.060 (1980); GRAND IsLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 37-10(a) (1981).
The Lincoln FEPO and Grand Island FEPO refer to the charge as a "com-
plaint". Nevertheless, for purposes of consistency, this Article will refer to
1983]
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provide that the charge must be ified within 180 days of the alleged
discriminatory act 47 and that the charge must be served upon the
person against whom the charge is made.48
the initial filing as a charge, regardless of the applicable statute or ordinance.
It should be noted that the Lincoln FEPO can also be invoked without the
filing of a charge. The city attorney is authorized to commence litigation in
district court if (1) any person is engaged in a "continuous pattern or prac-
tice" of employment discrimination, or (2) any "group of persons" has been
subjected to employment discrimination and the discrimination raises an "is-
sue of general public importance." LUicoLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.01.040(b)
(1980).
45. The Nebraska FEPA established the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commis-
sion (NEOC) to receive charges and enforce the Act. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-
1116 to 48-1117 (Supp. 1982). The Lincoln FEPO established the Lincoln Com-
mission on Human Rights (the "Lincoln Commission") to enforce the ordi-
nance. LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 11.02.030 to 11.02.040 (1980). The Grand
Island FEPO established the Commission on Human Rights of the City of
Grand Island (the "Grand Island Commission") to enforce the Act. GRAND
IsLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 37-1 to 37-2, 37-8 (1981).
46. The Omaha FEPO empowers a Director, OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-122
(1980), and a Civil Rights Hearing Board, id. at §§ 13-123 to 13-128 (the
"Omaha Commission"), to enforce the ordinance. In essence, the Omaha
FEPO separates the prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions with the Direc-
tor responsible for the former and the Omaha Commission responsible for
the latter. Charges are filed with the Director. Id. at § 13-134.
47. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1118(2) (Supp. 1982); Rule 2-1(g), NEOC, 6 NEB. ADMiN.
R. 2-2 (1977); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-135 (1980); LInCOLN, NEB., MUN.
CODE § 11.02.060 (1980); GRAND IsLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-10(c) (1981).
This Article will not consider a host of timeliness issues that might arise.
It will not, for example, consider problems in determining (1) what consti-
tutes the filing of a charge, see, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408
F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1979) (a complaint sent to the EEOC will qualify as a charge
even if it is not then sworn or affirmed); (2) when a violation occurs which
commences the running of the limitations period, see, e.g., Delaware State
College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980) (limitations period began to run when the
charging party was notified of tenure decision even though loss of teaching
position did not occur until a year later); Reeb v. Economic Opportunity At-
lanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975) (limitations period began to run when
potential Title VII violation became apparent to charging party); or (3) what
constitutes a continuing violation, see, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431
U.S. 553 (1977) (failure to credit plaintiff for past seniority is not a continuing
violation).
48. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1118(2) (Supp. 1982); Rule 2-2(a), NEOC, 6 NEB. ADMI.
R. 2-3 (1977); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-137 (1980); LINCOLN, NEB., MUN.
CODE § 11.02.060 (1980); GRAND ISLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-10(b) (1981).
The term "respondent" will be used to refer to the person against whom a
charge has been made.
The right of a charging party to fie a private lawsuit under the state or
local laws should not be prejudiced by the failure of the administrative
agency to timely serve notice of the charge on the respondent. See Fesel v.
Masonic Home, 428 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Del. 1977); McAdams v. Thermal In-
dustries, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 156, 159-60 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Heath v. D.H. Baldwin
Co., 447 F. Supp. 495, 501-02 (N.D. Miss. 1977).
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The procedures differ on who may ifie a charge. The Lincoln
FEPO allows any person claiming to be aggrieved, or his agent or
attorney, to ifie a charge.49 Similarly, the Omaha FEPO, although
ambiguous on the issue, appears to allow anyone to file a charge.5 0
The Grand Island FEPO, on the other hand, permits only persons
who claim to have been injured to file charges.5 1 The Nebraska
FEPA appears to require the Lincoln FEPO approach,52 but the
NEOC, by rule, permits only persons who have been personally
aggrieved to fie charges. 53 The Lincoln and Omaha approach to
the issue is preferable. Allowing charges to be filed on behalf of
aggrieved persons would "enable aggrieved persons to have
charges processed under circumstances where they are unwilling
to come forward publicly for fear of economic or physical
reprisals."5 4
The NEOC and Grand Island Commission do not have the au-
thority to file charges.5 5 They should have initiatory powers. As-
sume, for example, that in investigating a charge the NEOC
discovers that the charging party has not been subjected to dis-
crimination, but that the employer has engaged in widespead dis-
crimination against other employees. In the absence of initiatory
powers, the NEOC would be required to dismiss the charge of the
charging party and would be powerless to initiate a proceeding ad-
dressed to the discrimination discovered during the investiga-
tion.5 6 In addition, if the enforcement agencies had initiatory
powers they would be better able to discover and address systemic
or widespread discriminatory practices. Compared to case-by-case
adjudication based upon individual charges, this would result in a
more efficient utilization of litigation resources and a broader-
49. LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.060 (1980).
50. The Omaha FEPO defines charging party as the "individual making a charge
alleging an unlawful practice." OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-82(D) (1980). It
does not, then, require the person filing the charge to be "personally ag-
gieved." Cf. Rule 2-1(a), NEOC, 6 NEB. ADMIN. R. 2-1 (1977). In addition, the
Director is authorized to fie charges. OiAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-82(D)
(1980). As a result, the Omaha FEPO avoids problems created by restrictive
charge-filing requirements. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
51. GRAND IsLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-10(a) (1981).
52. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1118(1) (1978) (charge may be filed "by or on behafof a
person or persons claiming to be aggrieved") (emphasis added).
53. Rule 2-1(a), NEOC, 6 NEB. ADMm. R. 2-1 (1977). See also Rule 1-7, NEOC, 6
NEB. ADniN. R. 1-2 (1977).
54. 118 CONG. REc. 7,167 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams). The EEOC has
promulgated regulations to govern charges fied on behalf of aggrieved per-
sons. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7 (1982).
55. Cf. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-82(D) (1980); LINcoLN NEB., MUN. CODE
§ 11.02.040(c) (12) (1980); E.E.O.C. CompL. MAN. (CCH) 221-35 (1979).
56. See 1977-78 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 415, 416.
1983]
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based attack on illegal discriminatory practices. 57 For these, and
other,5 8 reasons, the NEOC and Grand Island Commission should
be given the power to file charges.5 9
C. The Reasonable Cause Determination
After receiving a charge, the fair employment practices agency
investigates the allegations contained in the charge and deter-
mines whether there is reasonable cause to believe that unlawful
discrimination has occurred.60
If the agency finds no reasonable cause to believe that discrimi-
nation has occurred,6 ' the agency will dismiss the charge.62 None
of the employment discrimination laws in Nebraska specifically
provide for judicial review of an agency decision to dismiss a
charge at this stage of the proceedings.6 3 Consequently, it could be
57. NEBRASKA ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NE-
BRASKA'S OFcFiAL CrViL RIGHTS AGENCIES 90 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975
NEBRASKA ADVISORY COMM.].
58. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
59. The Nebraska Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil
Rights has twice recommended that Nebraska enforcement agencies be given
initiatory powers. NEBRASKA ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, NEBRASKA HumAN RIGHTS AGENCIES 20, 54 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as 1982 NEBRASKA ADVISORY COMM.]; 1975 NEBRASKA ADVISORY COMM., Mupra
note 57, at 90. See also M. SoVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DIScRIINA-
TION IN EMPLoYMENT 31-33 (1966).
60. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1118(1) (Supp. 1982); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-138
(1980) (the Director must make the reasonable cause determination within
two years of the filing of the charge, OMAHA, NEB., Mum. CODE § 13-142 (1980));
LINCOLN, NEB., MuN. CODE § 11.02.060 (1980) (the Lincoln FEPO requires the
Lincoln Commission investigation to begin within 30 days of the filing of the
charge); GRAND ISLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-8(d) (1981).
61. Rule 2-2(c), NEOC, 6 NEB. ADmIN. R. 2-3 (1977); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-
141 (1980); LINCOLN, NEB., Mu. CODE § 11.02.040(c) (8) (1980); GRAND ISLAND,
NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-8(d) (1981).
62. The NEOC will dismiss the charge (1) if it determines that the NEOC lacks
jurisdiction; (2) if it determines that there is not reasonable cause to believe
that the alleged unfair employment practice has occurred, (3) if the matter is
adjusted and settled during the investigation; or (4) if the party filing the
charge has failed to cooperate in the investigation of the charge. Rule 2-2(c),
NEOC, 6 NEB. ADMIN. R. 2-3 (1977). Although the local agencies are not as
specific, presumably they would dismiss a charge for the same or very similar
reasons.
63. The judicial review provisions of the Nebraska fair employment practices
laws specifically provide for judicial review only at later points in the pro-
ceedings. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1120 (1978) (judicial review available after a
hearing before the NEOC or a hearing officer); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-
199 (1980) (judicial review available after Omaha Commission issues an or-
der); LINCOLN, NEB., MUm. CODE § 11.02.070 (1980) (judicial review available
after a hearing before the Lincoln Commission); GRAND ISLAND, NEB., MUN.
CODE § 37-14 (1981) (judicial review available after conciliation effort).
The Omaha FEPO does permit a charging party to request a reconsidera-
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argued that the agency decision is not subject to judicial review.64
An agency decision to dismiss a charge, however, should be sub-
ject to judicial review. Only through judicial review can a com-
plainant be protected from an erroneous decision made at this
early stage of the proceedings. 65
The legal argument for judicial review of an adverse reasonable
cause determination varies depending on the agency making the
determination.66 Adverse reasonable cause determinations by the
NEOC can be obtained through an expansive reading of the judi-
tion of the Director's dismissal of a charge. OmAuA, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 13-
148 to 13-150 (1980). Under the Nebraska FEPA, however, the attorney gen-
eral has determined that reconsideration is possible only where the NEOC
has made a finding of reasonable cause. Compare, 1979-80 Op. Neb. Att'y
Gen. 260 with Opinion letter of Att'y Gen. to NEOC Executive Director, Law-
rence R. Myers (Oct. 17, 1977) (on ifie with the Nebraska Law Review). The
absence of even the limited review available upon reconsideration under-
scores the need for judicial review of no reasonable cause determinations.
See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
64. 'The right of appeal [from agency action] in this state is clearly statutory and
unless [a] statute provides for an appeal ..... such right does not exist."
Gretna Pub. School Dist. No. 37 v. State Bd. of Educ., 201 Neb. 769, 772, 272
N.W.2d 268, 269 (1978). See also Lydick v. Johns, 185 Neb. 717, 178 N.W.2d 581
(1970); Note, The Right to Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action:
Nebraska's "Clearly Statutory" Rule, 58 NEB. L. REV. 1139 (1979).
65. In the absence of review, there would be no judicial interpretation of restric-
tive jurisdictional decisions and no double-check of "no reasonable cause"
determinations. Judicial review of no reasonable cause determinations is
particularly important because (1) decisions at this stage of the proceeding
are made after an ex parte investigation and without the advantages and
checks provided by an adversarial proceeding, see Beverly v. Lone Star Lead
Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971); Flowers v. Local No. 6, Laborers
Int'l Union of N. Am., 431 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1970); Fekete v. United States
Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3rd Cir. 1970), and (2) "inadequate staffing of state
agencies can lead to a tendency to dismiss too many [charges] for alleged
lack of [reasonable] cause," Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S. Ct.
1883, 1910 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Bonfield, An Institutional
Analysis of Agencies Administering Fair Employment Practices Laws (Pt.
II), 42 N.Y.U. L REv. 1035, 1048-49 (1967)). See also Note, The California
FEPC: Stepchild of the State Agencies, 18 STAN. L, REv. 187, 191 (1965). The
federal record is replete with examples of judicial findings in favor of Title
VII plaintiffs after an EEOC determination of "no reasonable cause." See,
e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Robinson v. Loril-
lard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971). See generally Note, The Right to Equal
Treatment. Administrative Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Legislation,
74 Hav. L. REv. 526, 571-73 (1961).
66. Judicial review may be required by the Constitution. In Logan v. Zimmer-
man Brush Co., 102 S. Ct. 1148 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a charging
party had a property interest in a cause of action created by a state fair em-
ployment practices act. The due process clause, then, requires "some form of
a hearing" before a charging party can be deprived of his cause of action. Id.
at 1156-57. The ex parte investigation conducted prior to a reasonable cause
determination probably is not sufficient to satisfy the due process clause.
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cial review provisions of the Nebraska FEPA67 or, alternatively,
under the Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act.68 Judicial re-
view of adverse determinations by the Omaha or Grand Island
Commissions should be available by filing a petition in error in the
appropriate district court.69 No reasonable cause determinations
by the Lincoln Commission should be subject to judicial review
under the special appeals statute for cities of the primary class. 70
Regardless of the legal argument utilized, judicial review at this
stage of the proceedings would be based on the record of the
agency 7' and the remedy for an improper dismissal should be a
remand to the agency with directions to find reasonable cause and
to continue the proceedings.7 2
67. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1120(1) (1978) permits "[a]ny party to a proceeding
before the [NEOC] aggrieved by such decision and order [to] institute pro-
ceedings in the district court .... " The provision clearly applies to an
NEOC decision and order based upon a hearing conducted subsequent to a
"reasonable cause" determination. The provision could also be interpreted to
permit judicial review of an NEOC order to dismiss a charge at an earlier
stage of the proceeding. Such an NEOC order must be accompanied by a
decision specifying the reasons for the dismissal. Rule 2-2(c), NEOC, 6 NEB.
ADmwN. R. 2-3 (1977).
68. If the judicial review provisions of the Nebraska FEPA do not apply to admin-
istrative dismissals of charges, the Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act,
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-917 to 84-919 (1981), should apply. Duffy v. Physicians
Mut. Ins. Co., 191 Neb. 233, 239, 214 N.W.2d 471, 475 (1974). The Nebraska Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review of an agency's "final
decision in a contested case." NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917(1) (1981). An NEOC
decision to dismiss a charge is clearly a "final decision;" the NEOC takes no
further action on a charge once it is dismissed. 1979-80 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen.
260, 262 ('"ere is no final order of the [NEOC] until they.., dismiss the
action according to their regulations."). It is less clear that the NEOC has
acted in a "contested case." The Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act de-
fines a "contested case" as "a proceeding before an agency in which the legal
rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitu-
tional right to be determined after an agency hearing." NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-
901(3) (1981). Although a full discussion of the issue is beyond the scope of
this Article, a person has a constitutional right to some type of agency hear-
ing, however minimal, before a charge of discrimination can be dismissed.
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 102 S. Ct. 1148 (1982). Thus, judicial review
should be available under the Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act. See
generally, Willborn, A Time for Change: A Critical Analysis of the Nebraska
Administrative Procedure Act, 60 NEB. L. REV. 1, 12-13, 30-34 (1981).
69. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1901 to 25-1908 (1979).
70. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 15-1201 to 15-1205 (1977). See American Stores Packing Co.
v. Jordan, 213 Neb. 213, 218, 328 N.W.2d 756, 759 (1982).
71. The judicial review provisions of all of the statutes cited above, see supra
notes 67-70, provide for review based upon the record of the agency.
72. The Nebraska FEPA, Omaha FEPO, and Lincoln FEPO confer the task of
initially adjudicating discrimination claims upon the appropriate administra-
tive agency. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1119 (1978); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 13-
156 to 13-171 (1980); LINcoLN, NEB., MiUN. CODE § 11.02.070 (1980). Cf. Title VII
§ 706, 42 U.S.C. § 20003-5 (1976) (initial adjudication occurs in federal court).
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If the agency finds reasonable cause to believe unlawful dis-
crimination has occurred, either at its own instance or by court or-
der, the agency next attempts to informally settle the matter.
D. Conciliation
After finding reasonable cause, the administrative agency at-
tempts to "eliminate any [unlawful discrimination] by informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."73 This effort,
commonly called conciliation, is more than simply an attempt by
the administrative agency to settle the matter between the charg-
ing party and the respondent. To protect the public interest in the
elimination of employment discrimination, the agency is also a
party to conciliation.74
Conciliation may fail, then, even if the charging party and the
respondent reach a settlement.75 For example, the NEOC may re-
fuse to agree to the settlement if the charge contains allegations of
class-wide discrimination, but the settlement does not confer any
benefits on the class. 76 Theoretically, the NEOC could continue a
proceeding even in the face of such a settlement.77 NEOC continu-
ance of such a suit, however, is only theoretical because the NEOC
allows charging parties to withdraw charges at will. 78 Conse-
quently, if the charging party and the respondent reach a settle-
ment, but the NEOC will not agree to it, the charging party simply
The Grand Island FEPO requires a conciliation effort between the reasonable
cause determination and judicial action. GRAND IsLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE
§ 37-14 (1981). Consequently, a remand to the agency would remedy the error
and do the least violence to the respective enforcement schemes.
73. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1118(1) (Supp. 1982). See Rule 2-3(a), NEOC, 6 NEB.
ADMIN. R. 2-5 (1971); OMAHA, NEB., MuN. CODE § 13-142 (1980) (the Director
"shall endeavor to eliminate and remedy [the discrimination] by informal
methods of conference, conciliation, persuasion and- education"); LINCOLN,
NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.060 (1980); GRAND ISLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-
10(b) (1981).
74. The local agencies do not have regulations dealing with the problems that
may arise as part of the conciliation process. As a result, this section will deal
with the NEOC's approach to the problems. Presumably, the approach of lo-
cal agencies would be quite similar. See OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-144
(1980) (Director is authorized to enforce conciliation agreements).
75. Rule 2-3(c) (iii), NEOC, 6 NEB. ADnum. R. 2-6 to 2-7 (1977). Cf. 1979-80 Op. Neb.
Att'y Gen. 87 (settlement does not deprive NEOC of jurisdiction).
76. See E.E.O.C. COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 345 (1979).
77. In this situation, Rule 2-3(c) (iii), NEOC, 6 NEB. ADMIN. IR. 2-6 to 2-7 (1977),
provides that the NEOC "may close the case as having been settled on terms
not approved by the [NEOC] ...." (emphasis added). In that situation,
however, conciliation has failed; the NEOC must be a party to a conciliation
agreement. The Nebraska FEPA says the NEOC "may order a public hear-
ing" when conciliation fails. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1119(1) (1978).
78. Rule 2-1(h), NEOC, 6 NEB. ADm. R. 2-2 (1977).
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withdraws the charge.79 This process undermines the NEOC's
ability to protect the public interest. The problem could be reme-
died by requiring NEOC consent to any charge withdrawals8 0 and/
or by permitting the NEOC to fie charges on behalf of aggrieved
persons.8
By the same token, conciliation is more than simply a settle-
ment attempt because the NEOC may dismiss the charge during
conciliation even in the absence of an agreement between the
charging party and the respondent. The NEOC may dismiss the
charge if the respondent has eliminated, or in good faith offered to
eliminate, the effects of the alleged illegal employment practice.8 2
Dismissal of a charge at this stage of the proceedings once again
raises the issue of judicial review.83 Once again, judicial review
should be available.8 4
E. Administrative Hearing
If a charge is not dismissed and conciliation fails, three of the
enforcement schemes provide for administrative hearings.85 The
hearing procedures, however, are all slightly different.
Under the Nebraska FEPA, the NEOC orders a public hearing
and issues a complaint.86 After the respondent has had an oppor-
tunity to answer,87 a Hearing Examiner conducts the public hear-
ing.88 Both the charging party and the respondent are parties and
full participants in the hearing.89 At the conclusion of the hearing,
79. 1979-80 NEOC ANN. REP. 17.
80. Cf. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F. § 1601.10 (1981) ("A charge...
may be withdrawn... only with the consent of the Commission. .. ").
81. See E.E.O.C. Comp. MAN. (CCH) 349 (1979); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-
82(D) (1980) LiNcoLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.040(c) (12) (1980). See supra
notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
82. Rule 2-3(c) (ii), 6 NEB. ADMIN. R. 2-6 (1977).
83. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
85. The Grand Island FEPO does not provide for an administrative hearing.
Rather, if conciliation fails, the ordinance provides for a hearing in district
court. GRAND IsLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-14 (1981). See infra note 136 and
accompanying text.
86. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1119(1) (1978). The complaint must be issued within 120
days of the NEOC's reasonable cause determination. Rule 2-3(d), NEOC, 6
NEB. ADumnu. R. 2-7 (1977). The public hearing must be between 20 days and 60
days after issuance and service of the complaint. Rule 2-4(c)(ii), NEOC, 6
NEB. ADMuN. R. 2-9 (1977). The contents of the NEOC complaint and notice of
public hearing are specified by rule. Rules 2-4(b) to 2-4(c) (v), NEOC, 6 NEB.
ADumN. R. 2-7 to 2-9 (1977).
87. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1119(1) (1978); Rules 2-4(d) to 2-4(d) (vi), NEOC, 6 NEB.
AwmIN. R. 2-9 to 2-10 (1977).
88. Rule 3, NEOC, 6 NEB. ADnm. R. 3-1 to 3-6 (1977).
89. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1119(1) (1978).
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the Hearing Examiner issues a recommended order and deci-
sion.90 The NEOC then decides the case based upon the record
developed before the Hearing Examiner.91
Under the Omaha FEPO, the Director commences the hearing
process by fling a petition with the Omaha Board.92 Upon receiv-
ing the petition, the Omaha Board notifies the respondent of the
date, time, and place of the hearing.9 3 After opportunity to an-
swer,94 a Hearing Examiner conducts the hearing.95 The Director,
usually through an agent, prosecutes the action.9 6 The charging
party may be allowed to intervene as a party.97 At the conclusion
of the hearing, the Hearing Examiner issues a recommended or-
der.98 The Omaha Board then decides the case based upon the
record before the Hearing Examiner and oral argument.9 9
If conciliation is unsuccessful under the Lincoln FEPO, the Lin-
coln Commission has two options. First, it may refer the charge to
the city attorney and request the commencement of an action in
district court. 00 If the city attorney concurs,' 0 ' the court action
90. Rule 3-8, NEOC, 6 NEB. ADMIN. R. 3-5 to 3-6 (1977).
91. Rule 4-1, NEOC, 6 NEB. ADSUN. R. 4-6 (1977).
92. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-145 (1980); OMAHA CIVIL RIGHTS HEARING BD.
RuLEs, ch. 5, rule 1-1 to 1-2 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as OMAHA BD.
RuLEs]. The Omaha FEPO requires the Director to fie the petition within 30
days of his determination that conciliation has failed and within two years of
the date the charge is fied. OMAHA, NEB., Mut. CODE § 13-146 (1980). The
Omaha FEPO does not specify what is to happen if the Director fails to meet
these time limits. Presumably, in such an event, a respondent could claim
the Director must dismiss the charge. Such a claim, however, should be re-
jected. The Director's failure to meet a time limit, either at this stage of the
proceedings or at any other time, should not prejudice the rights of the charg-
ing party. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 102 S. Ct. 1148 (1982); C. SUL-
IrVAN, M. Z R & R. RICHARDs, FEDERAL STATuTORY LAw OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION § 3.2 n.8 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as FEDERAL STATU-
TORY LAw].
93. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-156 (1980); OMAHA ED. RuLEs ch. 5, rules 1-3 to
1-4 (1981).
94. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-158 (1980); OMAHA ED. RULES ch. 5, rules 2-1 to
2-6 (1981).
95. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-128(E) (1980); OMAHA ED. RULES ch. 5, rules 4-2
to 4-3 (1981).
96. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-157 (1980); OMAHA BD. RULES ch. 5, rules 4-4(a),
4-6(a) (1981). The Omaha Board has promulgated a number of rules relating
to the hearing. OMAHA ED. RuLEs ch. 5, rules 4 to 5 (1981).
97. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-159 (1980); OMAHA ED. RuLEs ch. 5, rule 4-4(b)
(1981).
98. OMAHA ED. RULES ch. 5, rules 7-1 to 7-2 (1981).
99. OMAHA ED. RULES ch. 5, rules 8-1 to 8-3 (1981).
100. LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.01.030(a) (1980).
101. The city attorney may, under the ordinance, refuse to institute a court action.
LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.01.030(a) (1980). The city attorney's discre-
tion, however, is quite limited. The city attorney may only review the com-
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would be brought in the name of the city on behalf of the charging
party. 0 2 Second, the Lincoln Commission may begin the adminis-
trative hearing procedure by serving a notice of hearing on the
respondent.103
The hearing under the Lincoln FEPO is conducted by a Hearing
Examiner,104 but the Lincoln Commission itself attends the hear-
ing'0 5 and makes the ultimate decision.106 In contrast to the hear-
ing procedure under the Omaha FEPO,107 the Lincoln Commission
does not prosecute the action.108 Instead, the charging party and
respondent are the only parties to the hearing,10 9 although others
may be allowed to intervene,1nO and the charging party has the bur-
den of proving his case."' The Lincoln Commission has promul-
gated fairly detailed regulations to govern the hearing." 2
F. Judicial Review
The judicial review provisions of the four employment discrimi-
nation laws in Nebraska are quite different.
Under the Nebraska FEPA, any aggrieved party" 3 may appeal
plaint to determine if it is "legally sufficient," id., and all findings of the
Lincoln Commission are binding on the city attorney and the city. LINCOLN,
NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.01.030(b) (1980).
102. LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.01.030(a) (1980).
103. LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.070(a) (1980); LINCOLN, NEB., COMM'N ON
HuMAN RIGHTS, RULES AND REGS. FOR CONDUCTING PUB. HEARINGS, rules 1-1 to
1-2 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as LINCOLN RULES].
104. LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.070(b) (1980); LINcoLN RULES, rule 4-2(a)
(1982).
105. LINCOLN, NEB., MuN. CODE § 11.02.070(b) (1980); LINCOLN RULES, rule 4-2(b)
(1982).
106. LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.070(e)-(f) (1980); LINCOLN RULES, rule 10-1
(1982).
107. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
108. LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 11.02.060(b), 11.02.070(d) (1980); LINCOLN RULES,
rules 4-4(a), 4-6(a) (1982). The Lincoln Commission has the power to file
charges. LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.040(c) (12) (1980). At hearings
based upon a charge filed by the Lincoln Commission, the case is prosecuted
by an attorney on the staff of the city attorney. LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE
§ 11.02.070(c) (1980).
109. LINCOLN RULES, rule 4-4(a) (1982).
110. LINCOLN RULES, rule 4-4(b) (1982).
111. LzNcoLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.060(b) (1980); LINCOLN RULES, rules 4-6(a),
16-1 (1982).
112. LINCOLN RULES, rules 1 to 16 (1982).
113. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1120(1) (1978). The Nebraska FEPA does not define the
term "party." It is clear, however, that the charging party and the respondent
are parties. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1119(1) (1978). In addition, "any other per-
son whose testimony has a bearing on the matter may be allowed to inter-
vene." NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1119(1) (1978). Thus, the scope of the term
"party" is quite broad. To appeal, a party must be aggrieved. There is no
guidance under the statute as to what constitutes aggrievement, even though,
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the NEOC's decision to district court.114 To obtain substantive re-
view, an aggrieved party must institute an action in district court
within thirty days from service of the NEOC's decision and or-
der.1 15 If a timely action is not filed, the NEOC may obtain en-
forcement of its decision and order upon a minimal showing of
jurisdiction. 16
The district court's review is based upon the record developed
before the Hearing Examiner.1 7 Under the Nebraska FEPA, then,
there is only one adjudicatory hearing. The hearing occurs before
a Hearing Examiner. All subsequent review is based upon the rec-
ord developed at that hearing.
The district court may overturn the NEOC's order and decision
if it is contrary to law,"18 unreasonable or arbitrary,"n9 or unsup-
ported by a preponderance of the evidence. 20 This scope of re-
as will be shown, the right of appeal to court is quite significant. See infra
notes 247-51 and accompanying text.
114. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1120(1) (1978). Judicial review need not take place in
the same county in which the public hearing was held. The public hearing
must be held in the county where the alleged unfair practice occurred. NEB.
REv. STAT. § 48-1119(1) (1978). Judicial review may take place in that county
or in any county in which a respondent required to take affirmative action by
an NEOC decision and order, resides or transacts business. NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 48-1120(1) (1978). Thus, a respondent with businesses throughout the state
who loses before the NEOC may file for review in virtually any county in the
state and, hence, require the NEOC and the charging party to defend in that
county. On the other hand, a charging party who loses before the NEOC may
file only in the county where the alleged unfair practice occurred. This dis-
crepancy may result in forum shopping and inconvenience to the parties; it
should be eliminated.
115. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1120(1) (1978).
116. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-1120(7) (1978). This provision, in essence, places the
burden of proceeding on aggrieved parties. If they do not seek timely judicial
review, they will lose their opportunity for substantive review. Cf. FTC v.
Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
117. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1120(3) (1978).
118. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1120(3) (a) (1978).
119. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1120 (3) (b) (1978).
120. Id. The Nebraska FEPA provides a different standard of judicial review for
NEOC decisions than the Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act provides
for judicial review of the contested case determinations of other agencies.
Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1120(3) (1978) with NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917 (6)
(1981). See Duffy v. Physicians Mut. Ins. Co., 191 Neb. 233,239,214 N.W.2d 471,
475 (1974). See generally Note, Employment Discrimination--Nebraska
Supreme Court Finds a Need to Prove Intent in Instances of Individual Dis-
crimination, Duffy v. Physicians Mutual Ins. Co., 191 Neb. 233,214 N.W.2d 471
(1974), 8 CREIGHTON I REV. 6, 14-17 (1974). The Nebraska FEPA uses a "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" standard for reviewing factual matters rather
than a "substantial evidence" standard. Compare NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-
1120(3) (b) (1978) uwith NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917(6) (e) (1981). Use of this stan-
dard gives district courts greater latitude in reviewing NEOC decisions. See,
e.g., Diamond M. Drilling Co. v. Marshall, 577 F.2d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 1978)
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view authorizes, in effect, a trial de novo upon the record in the
district court.121 The statute provides for appellate review.122 The
statute also provides for an award of attorneys' fees to the prevail-
ing party in the district court. 123
The Omaha FEPO provides that any aggrieved party' 24 may ap-
(substantial evidence is something less than a preponderance of the
evidence).
121. Snygg v. City of Scottsbluff Police Dep't., 201 Neb. 16, 17-18, 266 N.W.2d 76, 77
(1978). The Nebraska Supreme Court has exhibited some confusion on this
point. In Farmer v. Richman Gordman Stores, Inc., 203 Neb. 222, 278 N.W.2d
332 (1979), the court correctly cited Snygg for the proposition that "the review
in the District Court amounts to a trial de novo upon the record." Id at 223,
278 N.W.2d at 332-33. However, the court went on to say that the "District
Court was under the obligation to try the case de novo to determine whether
there was substantial evidence on which to base the order." Id. at 226, 278
N.W.2d at 334. That simply does not make sense. De novo review is different
from review based upon a substantial evidence standard. Compare Wright v.
Employment Div., 24 Or. App. 323, 326, 545 P.2d 613, 614 (1976) with Cusson v.
Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n, 524 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975). If the district courts are to engage in de novo review, they should not
merely be deciding whether substantial evidence supports the order. The
latter-cited statement in Farmer should be viewed as a temporary moment of
confusion, an ill-advised use of loose language.
122. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1120(4) (1978). The Nebraska Supreme Court will up-
hold factual findings by a district court if they are supported by substantial
evidence, but will review legal findings for their correctness. Ranger Division
v. Bayne, 214 Neb. 251, 253-54, 333 N.W.2d 891, 893 (1983); Snygg v. City of
Scottsbluff Police Dep't., 201 Neb. 16, 21, 266 N.W.2d 76, 79 (1978).
123. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-1120(6) (1978). The attorneys' fee provision has not yet
been subject to litigation. It is relatively clear from the statute's language,
however, that attorneys' fees will be available only if appeal is made to the
district court; conversely, attorneys' fees will not be available if the proceed-
ing concludes prior to appeal to the district court. Cf. New York Gaslight
Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980). The statute's language may also be
read to restrict attorneys' fees to work done as part of the appeal to district
court. See Farmer v. Richman Gordman Stores, Inc., 203 Neb. 222, 226, 278
N.W.2d 332, 334 (1979) ('The appellee is allowed a fee of $500for setvices in
this court.") (emphasis added). The courts have discretion in allowing attor-
neys' fees and should exercise that discretion, as the federal courts have, to
allow attorneys' fees to most prevailing charging parties, but to disallow at-
torneys' fees to most prevailing respondents. See Christiansburg Garment
Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
124. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-199 (1980); OMAHA BD. RULEs ch. 6, rule 3-1(a)
(1981). The Director and the respondent are parties to the proceeding before
the Omaha Commission. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-159 (1980); OMAHA
BD. RuLEs ch. 5, rule 4-4(a) (1981). The charging party is not necessarily a
party, but "may be allowed to intervene." OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-159
(1980); OMAHA BD. RuLxs ch. 5, rule 4-4(b) (1981). Thus, if the charging party
does not intervene, she will not be a party and will, as a result, not be able to
seek judicial review of an adverse decision. The Hearing Examiner may also
allow "any other person" to intervene. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-159
(1980); OMAHA BD. RULEs ch. 5, rule 4-4(c) (1981). To seek judicial review, a
party must "claim... to be aggrieved." OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-199
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peal the Omaha Commission's decision by filing a petition in error
in the district court.125 To obtain substantive review, the petition
in error must be filed within thirty days of the Omaha Commis-
sion's final order.126 If a timely petition in error is not fied in the
district court, the Director may obtain judicial enforcement of the
Omaha Commission's order upon a minimal showing of
jurisdiction.12 7
The district court's review in an error proceeding is based upon
the record developed before the Hearing Examiner. 28 The district
court's scope of review, however, is more limited than under the
Nebraska FEPA. The district court must affirm the Omaha Com-
mission if the Commission has acted within its jurisdiction and
there is some competent evidence to sustain its findings.129
The Lincoln FEPO provisions on judicial review are cryptic.130
The review, however, should take place under the special appeals
provision for cities of the primary class.13' The party appealing
must file a notice of appeal with the city clerk within thirty days of
the adverse decision 32 and a petition in the district court within
fifty days of the adverse decision. 3 3 The scope of review, like the
scope of review under the Nebraska FEPA,34 is quite broad. 35
(1980); OMAHA BD. RuLEs ch. 6, rule 3-1(a) (1981). If this standard is, as it
seems to be, something less than being actually aggrieved, cf. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 48-1120(1) (1978), judicial review may be more readily available under the
Omaha FEPO than under the Nebraska FEPA. See supra note 113.
125. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-199 (1980); OMAHA BD. RuLEs ch. 6, rule 3-1(a)
(1981). See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1901 to 25-1910 (1979).
126. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-200 (1980); OMAHA BD. RULES ch. 6, rule 3-1(b)
(1981).
127. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-201 (1980); OMAHA BD. RuLEs ch. 6, rule 3-2(a)
(1981).
128. Dovel v. School Dist. No. 23, 166 Neb. 548, 553, 90 N.W.2d 58, 62 (1958).
129. City of Omaha Human Relations Dep't. v. City Wide Rock & Excavation Co.,
201 Neb. 405, 407, 268 N.W.2d 98, 100 (1978).
130. LINCoLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.070(i) (1980) provides: "Such orders of the
[Lincoln Commission] may be appealed to the district court for Lancaster
County as provided by law."
131. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 15-1201 to 15-1205 (1977). See American Stores Packing Co.
v. Jordan, 213 Neb. 213, 218, 328 N.W.2d 756, 759 (1982).
132. NEB. REV. STAT. § 15-1202 (1977).
133. NEB. REV. STAT. § 15-1204 (1977). By regulation, the Lincoln Commission has
provided that, if a timely review action is not filed, the Commission may ob-
tain enforcement of its decision and order upon a minimal showing of juris-
diction. LINcoLN RuLEs, rule 12-2 (1982). The Lincoln Commission has
explicitly been given the authority to promulgate rules and regulations. LiN-
coLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.040(c) (4) (1980). Consequently, its rules are
substantive and should be granted the force and effect of law. See Batterton
v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977). But see LINcoLN RULEs, rules 12-1(a) to
12-1(b) (1982) (indicating erroneous appeal procedure and time limits).
134. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
135. NEB. REV. STAT. § 15-1205 (1977) provides that the district court shall "deter-
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If conciliation fails in Grand Island, the Grand Island Commis-
sion may commence an action on behalf of the charging party in
district court. 3 6 Thus, the adjudicatory hearing under the Grand
Island FEPO is conducted in state court.
I. COORDINATION OF STATE AND LOCAL
PROCEDURES137
To explore the question of how state and local procedures are
coordinated, let us consider this example. Complainant files a
charge with the state NEOC. At some point in the proceeding-
whether after a reasonable cause determination, or after the ad-
ministrative hearing, or even after a court decision-the complain-
ant decides to abandon the state procedure and file a charge with
the Lincoln Commission. What effect should the determinations in
the state procedure have on the local agency? Similarly, what ef-
fect should prior local determinations have on the state agency?
This section will address these questions.
A. Administrative Coordination
By statute, 3 8 the state has attempted to coordinate the efforts
of state and local agencies. The NEOC, however, does not follow
the statute. Instead, it follows a regulation139 which makes the
preclusive effect of prior decisions much less clear.
By statute, the NEOC may refer all charges to an appropriate
mine anew all questions raised before the city." One district court, with the
apparent acquiescence of the Nebraska Supreme Court, has interpreted this
to require a trial de novo upon the record developed before the Lincoln Com-
mission. American Stores Packing Co. v. Jordan, 213 Neb. 213,217,328 N.W.2d
756, 758 (1982). If that is correct, the scope of review would be identical to
that under the Nebraska FEPA. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying
text. The "determine anew" language, however, could be read to authorize
even broader judicial review. That is, it could be interpreted to permit the
introduction of new evidence at the district court level.
136. GRAND IsLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-14 (1981).
137. Section III considers only the interrelationship of the state and local fair
employment practices laws. Federal law, obviously, provides a claimant with
still another possible forum. Title VIt and its procedural relationship with
Nebraska's state and local laws will be discussed in Part Two of this Article.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
138. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-113 (Supp. 1982).
139. Rule 2-2(d), NEOC, 6 NEB. ADmN. R. 2-4 (1977). In areas outside of the pri-
mary scope of this Article, the Lincoln FEPO coordinates state and local pro-
cedures. LINCOLN, NEB., MuN. CODE § 11.01.050 (1980) provides that the
Lincoln Commission will not process a charge if a civil action is filed under
NEn. REV. STAT. § 20-119 (1977) (housing discrimination) or NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 48-1008 (1978) (age discrimination in employment).
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local agency.140 Once it does so, the NEOC is to "take no further
action .. if the local agency proceeds promptly to handle [the
charge]."141 The NEOC would only consider a referred charge if it
determines that the "local agency is not handling a complaint with
reasonable promptness, or that the protection of the rights of the
parties or the interests of justice requires such action."142 Thus,
the local agency would initially resolve all charges filed within its
jurisdiction. The state would intervene only when necessary io
vindicate the state's interest.143 For example, the state would in-
tervene when the local agency, because of inadequate funding or
for other reasons, was unable to promptly deal with its case load;
when there was reason to believe the local agency may be biased
against a particular complainant or respondent; or when the local
ordinance did not provide the substantive protection of the state
statute.144 The NEOC should promulgate a procedural regulation
which would permit complainants to petition the NEOC for state
intervention and NEOC determinations on these petitions should
be subject to judicial review.145
The statute, if followed, would effectuate an acceptable coordi-
nation of state and local procedures. 4 6 The procedures, both state
and local, provide comparable procedural protections. They all
conclude with consideration by the district court.14 The proce-
dure required by the statute strikes a reasonable balance between
an efficient allocation of enforcement resources and adequate pro-
tection of state interests.
The NEOC, however, does not follow the dictates of the statute.
In practice, the place of filing determines the agency that will con-
duct the initial processing. If a charge is initially filed with the
NEOC, the local agency will generally defer to the NEOC. If a
charge is initially filed with a local agency, the NEOC will refrain
from processing the charge until the local agency has completed
its investigation and made a reasonable cause determination. 48
140. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-113 (Supp. 1982).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See infra notes 193-94 & 199-200 and accompanying text
144. The Grand Island FEPO, for example, does not have a provision on discrimi-
nation in apprenticeship or training programs or a provision protecting
against employer retaliation. See supra note 11. The state, then, would have
to act on charges in those areas.
145. Cf. supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text
146. See infra note 200 and accompanying text
147. As noted above, however, judicial review of decisions of the Omaha FEPO is
based upon a more deferential standard than judicial review of NEOC deci-
sions. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29. This factor may, in appro-
priate cases, justify state intervention.
148. Rule 2-2(d) (1), NEOC, 6 NEB. ADmNu. R. 24 (1977).
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The NEOC then "accord[s] substantial weight" to the findings of
the local agency.149 The NEOC may agree with a local agency's
finding of reasonable cause and either adopt the local agency's
conciliation of the charge15O or commence its own conciliation pro-
cess. 5 1 Similarly, the NEOC may agree with a local agency's find-
ing of no reasonable cause and dismiss a charge 5 2 or disagree with
such a finding and begin its own investigation. 5 3
This is not a very efficient administrative coordination of efforts.
Charges are not channelled to an agency for initial processing.
5 4
Instead, since the place of filing determines which agency will con-
duct the initial processing, the charging party makes the determi-
nation. Moreover, the administrative coordination probably does
not avoid duplication to the extent contemplated by the statute. 5 5
The NEOC practice, then, requires consideration of another
mechanism for coordinating state and local procedures.S6
B. Issue and Claim Preclusion
The state and local procedures may also be coordinated by pre-
clusion doctrines. 5 7 Under res judicata or claim preclusion, 5 8 a
149. Id. at rule 2-2(d) (2).
150. Id. at rule 2-2(d)(4).
151. Id. at rule 2-2(d)(3).
152. Id. at rule 2-2(d) (5).
153. Id. at rule 2-2(d) (5).
154. Cf. Title VII, § 706(c)-(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)-(d) (1976) (requires state or
local consideration of the charge before federal agency considers the charge).
155. If the NEOC interprets "substantial weight" so as to preclude state interven-
tion unless "the rights of the parties or the interests of justice" require inter-
vention, NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-113 (Supp. 1982), the NEOC's regulation wil
avoid duplication to the same extent as the statute. It seems more likely,
however, that the "substantial evidence" standard permits more liberal state
intervention and, consequently, results in greater duplication.
156. Even if the NEOC followed the statute, a consideration of preclusion doc-
trines would be required. Federal courts considering discrimination claims
must give "the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those
judgments would be given in the courts of the state from which the judg-
ments emerged." Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1889
(1982). Thus, the preclusive effect of state determinations will be important
in determining the coordination between the state procedures and Title VII.
This issue will be more fully discussed in Part Two of this Article.
157. This Article is primarily concerned with coordination of the procedures of
Title VII, the Nebraska FEPA, and local fair employment practices ordi-
nances. Preclusion plays a role in that coordination. Preclusion may also
play a role where other agencies decide claims or issues relevant to a subse-
quent discrimination charge. Assume, for example, that a teacher tenure
panel, after a hearing, upholds the dismissal of a tenured teacher and that the
determination is affirmed on appeal in state court. Assume further that the
dismissed teacher then files a charge with the state fair employment prac-
tices commission. Should the prior determination of the teacher tenure
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final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties
from relitigating claims that were or could have been raised in that
action. 5 9 Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion prevents relitiga-
tion of issues that were actually and necessarily litigated in a prior
proceeding. 60 Thus, a decision by a local agency or district court
under a local ordinance may preclude a subsequent action under
the Nebraska FEPA, or vice versa. The courts, however, have not
considered and, hence, have provided little guidance on the appli-
cation of preclusion doctrines to employment discrimination cases
in Nebraska. Consequently, to determine how Nebraska's preclu-
sion doctrines should be applied in this area, it is necessary to ex-
amine the purposes of preclusion doctrines and the purposes of
multiple forums in employment discrimination cases.' 6 '
panel preclude commission consideration of the discrimination charge? See
Umberfield v. School Dist. 11, 185 Colo. 165, 522 P.2d 730 (1974) (yes). See also
McCorison v. Boosalis, No. CV82-L-80 (D. Neb. Feb. 15, 1983) (decision of Ne-
braska Department of Labor, enforced in state court, precludes a subsequent
Title VII action). This Article will not directly consider preclusion issues
where agencies other than antidiscrimination agencies made the initial deter-
mination. Nevertheless, a substantial portion of the discussion herein should
be applicable to situations like the one postulated. See Colorado Springs
Coach Co. v. State Civil Rights Comm'n, 35 Colo. App. 378, 536 P.2d 837 (1975);
Note, Administrative Law-Res Judicata-Application of Res Judicata to
Agencies with Parallel Jurisdiction, 52 DEN. L.J. 595 (1975); see generally Ves-
tal & Hill, Preclusion in Labor Controversies, 35 OKiA. L. REV. 281, 323-27
(1982).
158. "The law of former adjudication is frought with confused terminology." Hol-
land, Modernizing Res Judicata: Reflections on the Parklane Doctrine, 55 IND.
L.J. 616, 615 (1980). "Res judicata" is used by some commentators to refer to
both issue and claim preclusion and by other commentators to refer only to
claim preclusion. Compare lB J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 0.441[2], at 3775-76 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE] with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 3 intro-
ductory note at 131 (1982). See generally 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & G.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as FEDERAL PRACTICE]. This Article will use the terms "claim preclusion"
and "issue preclusion" as indicated below, see infra text accompanying notes
159-60, and the term "preclusion doctrines" to refer to both claim and issue
preclusion.
159. See Thomas v. Weller, 204 Neb. 298, 301-02, 281 N.W.2d 790, 792 (1979); Bank of
Mead v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 202 Neb. 403, 406, 275 N.W.2d 822, 824-
25 (1979); Wischmann v. Raikes, 168 Neb. 728, 738, 97 N.W.2d 551, 557 (1959).
See also Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1889-90 n.6 (1982);
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Allen v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352
(1876); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17-26 (1982).
160. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1889-90 n.6 (1982); Mon-
tana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17, 27-29
(1982).
161. While preclusion rules were at one time doctrines "of finality expressed and
implemented through a cluster of axiomatic rules of law specific in form, ab-
19831
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
1. The Purposes of Preclusion Doctrines
Preclusion doctrines foreclose investigations into the truth.162
An argument that a first judgment should be disregarded because
it is wrong will ordinarily fall victim to an assertion of preclu-
sion.163 Viewed in this manner, preclusion doctrines are different
and more dangerous than most other procedural rules. Most pro-
cedural rules are intended to enhance, or at least contribute to, the
process of truth-flnding;64 preclusion rules prohibit that pro-
cess.165 The central issue, then, in any discussion of the rationale
of preclusion doctrines is whether the purposes of the doctrines
solute in force, and mandatory in application," Holland, supra note 158, at 616,
that is no longer true. Preclusion rules are now flexible doctrines that bend
in response to competing interests. Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C.
Cir. 1951); Greenfield v. Mather, 32 Cal. 2d 23, 35, 194 P.2d 1, 8 (1948). See also
Parklane Hosiery Co., v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (trial courts have
broad discretion to determine when issue preclusion should be applied). See
generally Comment, Res Judicata" Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the
Effect of Prior State-Court Determinations, 53 VA. L REv. 1360, 1361-63 (1967).
Consequently, to determine the applicability of preclusion rules to employ-
ment discrimination cases, it is necessary to examine the competing interests
in the area.
162. Griswold, Res Judicata in Federal Tax Cases, 46 YALE L.J. 1320, 1320 (1937).
163. See, e.g., Morimoto v. Nebraska Children's Home Soc'y, 176 Neb. 403, 407-08,
126 N.W.2d 184, 188 (1964); Schleuning v. Tatro, 122 Neb. 3, 7, 238 N.W. 741, 743
(1931); Kazebeer v. Nunemaher, 82 Neb. 732, 735-36, 118 N.W. 646, 648 (1908);
Boasen v. State, 47 Neb. 245, 246-47, 66 N.W. 303, 304 (1896). See also Feder-
ated Dep't. Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phil-
lips, 274 U.S. 316, 325 (1927); Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 510-11
(1903); Westwood Chem. Co. v. Kulick, 656 F.2d 1224, 1231 (6th Cir. 1981);
Kemp v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1049, 1052 (5th Cir. 1979); Mitchell v.
National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265, 272 (2nd Cir. 1977).
164. Clearly, not all procedural rules are intended solely to enhance the truth-
finding process. Some rules have purposes in addition to truth-finding en-
hancement. For example, necessary parties, intervention, and interpleader
rules are intended, in part, to avoid the imposition of conflicting legal obliga-
tions on a single individual. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Pat-
terson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968) (necessary parties rule); Cascade Natural Gas Co.
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 368 U.S. 129 (1967) (intervention rule); State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967) (interpleader rule). See Hazard,
Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 S. CAl. L. REV. 1036, 1042 n.16 (1971). Moreover,
some rules directly interfere with the truth-finding process. See, e.g., Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (illegally seized evidence may not be
used in federal courts); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (illegally seized evi-
dence may not be used in state courts); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1
(1953) (privilege for state secrets is recognized); FED. R. EVID. 605 (judge may
not be a witness); FED. R. Evm. 503 (attorney-client privilege). Despite this,
it is true that most procedural rules are intended to enhance the truth-finding
process. Rules that do not do so, such as various exclusionary rules, also
raise the issue of whether their purposes outweigh their interference with
truth-finding.
165. Preclusion rules prohibit any inquiry into the truth. Other procedural rules
which inhibit truth-finding processes, see supra note 164, do so in a more Urn-
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outweigh the doctrines' prohibition of truth-finding in a particular
area.
66
The Nebraska Supreme Court167 has succinctly stated the pur-
poses of preclusion rules: "[Preclusion rules are] grounded, first,
on a public policy and the necessity to terminate litigation, and,
second, on the belief that a person should not be vexed more than
once for the same cause."1 68 Stated in that way, the purposes of
preclusion doctrines in Nebraska mirror the purposes generally re-
cited for preclusion doctrines. 169 To facilitate the necessary bal-
ancing of competing interests,170 however, the purposes must be
stated with more precision.
The core purpose of preclusion doctrines, reflected in the Ne-
braska Supreme Court's cryptic statement, is to "put ... an end to
litigation."'171 "[F] airness to the defendant, and sound judicial ad-
ministration, require that at some point litigation over [a] particu-
lar controversy come to an end."'172 Thus stated, the preclusion
rules provide protection, security, and incentives.
ited fashion; they will, for example, exclude certain evidence, but allow the
process to continue on the basis of other evidence.
166. See Griswold, supra note 162, at 1355. Some commentators have argued that
the burden should be reversed. That is, that preclusion doctrines should gen-
erally apply unless there is present an overriding, competing principle of
public policy. See, e.g., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 158, at I
0.405[1]-0.495 [12]; Hazard, supra note 164, at 1043-44. I would agree if the pri-
mary goal were repose. Accepting repose as the primary goal, though, begs
the question. The question is whether the goals supporting the preclusion
doctrines, including predominantly the goal of repose, override competing
goals, such as truth-seeking or conciliation. And a predominant goal of all
procedural rules, I would submit, is truth-seeking.
167. The development of preclusion doctrines has been largely judicial in origin.
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 158, at § 4403; Comment, Res Judicata in Ad-
ministrative Law, 47 YALE L.J. 1250, 1251 (1940). Consequently, the Nebraska
Supreme Court is the best source of the policies supporting preclusion doc-
trines in Nebraska.
168. DeCosta Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Kirkland, 210 Neb. 815, 819, 316 N.W.2d 772,
775 (1982). See also Gaspar v. Flott, 209 Neb. 260, 262-63, 307 N.W.2d 500, 502
(1981); Vantage Enter., Inc. v. Caldwell, 196 Neb. 671, 675, 244 N.W.2d 678, 680
(1976); Norlanco, Inc. v. County of Madison, 186 Neb. 100, 105, 181 N.W.2d 119,
122 (1970); American Province Real Estate Corp. v. Metropolitan Util. Dist.,
178 Neb. 348, 351, 133 N.W.2d 466, 468 (1965).
169. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65 (1878).
See generally Vestal & Hill, supra note 157, at 296-303.
170. See supra note 161.
171. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 1 comment a (1942).
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 comment a (1982). See also
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1889-90 n.6 (1982); FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 158, § 4403, at 15-17; MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 158, T 0.405, at 628-29; Currie, Res Judicata. The Neglected Defense, 45 U.
Cm. L. REV. 317, 325 (1978).
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Victorious parties are protected against "oppression by a
wealthy, wishful or even paranoid adversary." 7 3 Moreover, it has
been argued that unsuccessful parties are protected against their
own folly in making a second attempt. 74 There are, of course,
other ways of protecting against harassment through litigation, 75
especially in employment discrimination cases. 7 6 To the extent
these methods are effective, the protection afforded by preclusion
rules becomes less necessary.
Preclusion rules also provide security. They free litigants from
"the uncertain prospect of [continuing] litigation, with all its costs
to emotional peace and the ordering of future affairs." 7 7 It is not
self-evident, however, that this interest in security should always
override the interest in reaching correct results through appropri-
ate procedures. There is a recognition in the preclusion rules
themselves that continued litigation should not be foreclosed
where the procedures utilized in the first action were inade-
quate 7 8 or where there is a statutory policy against foreclosure. 7 9
Finally, preclusion rules encourage the parties to fully and effi-
ciently litigate the relevant issues in the first action.180 It may be,
though, that under some statutory schemes, a full litigation in the
first action is neither necessary nor economical.' 8 '
173. FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 158, § 4403, at 14. See Vantage Enter., Inc. v.
Caldwell, 196 Neb. 671, 677, 244 N.W.2d 678, 682 (1976). See also Kremer v.
Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1889-90 n.6 (1982); Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979); Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
174. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S.
313, 338 (1971). See FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 158, § 4403, at 14. The bla-
tant paternalism of this justification displays little respect for parties or their
counsel.
175. Johnson v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 207 Neb. 521, 300 N.W.2d 10 (1980);
McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Willan, 63 Neb. 391, 88 N.W. 497 (1901).
See Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 347-48 (1948). See
generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 120-21 (1971).
176. The Nebraska FEPA and Title VII provide for an award of attorneys' fees to a
prevailing party. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1120(6) (1978); Title VII, § 706(k), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). See supra note 123.
177. FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 158, § 4403, at 15. See also Cleary, supra note
175, at 345-46.
178. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1897 (1982); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,95 (1980); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 164
n.11 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Found.,
402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§§ 28(3), 28(5), 83(2), 84(3) (b) (1982).
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 83(4), 84(3)(a), 86 (1982). Cf.
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1890 (1982); Allen v. Mc-
Curry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-101 (1980).
180. FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 158, § 4403, at 14-15.
181. See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
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In addition to the interests in repose noted above, the preclu-
sion doctrines may also further two, primarily public, interests: 82
[Preclusion doctrines preserve] the acceptability of judicial'dispute reso-
lution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same mat-
ter were twice litigated to inconsistent results. It is easier to live with the
abstract knowledge that our imperfect trial processes would often produce
opposite results in successive efforts than to accept repeated concrete re-
alization of that fact.
1 8 3
Despite this, preclusion doctrines have "little direct relevance to
maintaining 'public confidence' in the courts." 84 The appeals
processes themselves lead to "repeated concrete realizations" of
inconsistent results. Indeed, inconsistencies revealed through re-
versals on appeal should lead to more "corrosive disrespect" than
reversals based upon the development of a new record; the new
record, at least, provides an explanation for inconsistencies other
than the whims of the decisionmaker. It may be, though, that the
concern is not merely with inconsistencies, but rather with con-
flicting legal obligations. 8 5 If that is the case, the preclusion doc-
trines should be tailored to preclude relitigation only where
conflicting legal obligations are possible or likely. 8 6
A second public policy is the preservation of court time.187 Pre-
clusion rules may serve as a device for allocating scarce judicial
182. These public interests are relatively weak justifications for preclusion rules.
Preclusion may be waived by the parties and this "suggests that the needs of
judicial administration are, at best, of subsidiary value" as a policy basis for
preclusion rules. Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. United States, 372
F.2d 969, 977 (Ct CL 1967). See FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 158, §§ 4403-04.
183. FEDERAL PRA TiCE, supra note 158, § 4403, at 12. See also Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979); Semler v. Psychiatric Inst. of Washington,
575 F.2d 922, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See generally George, Sweet Uses of Adver-
sity: Parklane Hosiery and the Collateral Class Action, 32 STAN. TL REv. 655,
674-81 (1980); Cleary, supra note 175, at 345-46.
184. Hazard, supra note 164, at 1041.
185. Dunlap v. City of Chicago, 435 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (D.C. IIl. 1977). See Hazard,
supra note 164, at 1042.
186. Successive employment discrimination cases rarely present the possibility of
conflicting legal obligations. A decision in favor of an employer does not re-
sult in an order that the employer shall not pay, but rather an order that the
employer need not pay. A subsequent decision on the same claim in favor of
an employee would not, then, result in a conflicting legal obligation. There
would be a conflict in result, but not in the legal obligations imposed on the
employer. In rare cases, however, the possibility of conflicting legal obliga-
tions may arise which would justify the use of preclusion doctrines. Los An-
geles Dep't. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707-11 & n.20 (1978).
See M. ZImmER, C. SuLLvAN & R. RICHARDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EM-
PLoyMENT DIsCRnMINATION 254 n.2 (1982).
187. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Montana v. United States,
440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Schmieder v. Hall, 545 F.2d 768, 771 (2nd Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Walker v. Chase, 53 Me. 258, 260 (1865); Van-
tage Enter., Inc. v. Caldwell, 196 Neb. 671, 677, 244 N.W.2d 678, 682 (1976).
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resources. However, this policy base for the preclusion doctrines
has not been well received by the commentators:
On its face, this argument does not go far toward explaining why society
should not bear the costs of reaching a correct result. In addition, it suf-
fers from the lack of any persuasive showing that so many lawyers or cli-
ents are so foolhardy that the total workload of the courts would be
augmented appreciably by repeated recourse to the hazards of
litigation.
1 8 8
2. The Purposes of Multiple Forums in Employment
Discrimination Cases
The reasons for multiple forums in employment discrimination
cases is not an issue that has caught the fancy of commentators.189
Nevertheless, it is an important issue in deciding how these fo-
rums should interrelate and, particularly, in deciding how preclu-
sion rules should be applied in the area.190
Multiple forums in employment discrimination cases arose pri-
marily out of the tension between the desire to preserve and en-
courage local involvement in the antidiscrimination effort and the
need to ensure an adequate national response to the problem. Ti-
tle VII, then, preserves local involvement by requiring initial resort
to local fair employment practices agencies:191 "[M] any States al-
ready have functioning antidiscrimination programs to insure...
equal employment opportunity. [Title VII seeks] to guarantee
that these states-and other States which may establish such pro-
grams-will be given every opportunity to employ their expertise
and experience without premature interference by the Federal
Government."' 9 2 At the same time, the drafters of Title VII real-
188. FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 158, § 4403, at 13-14. See Cleary, supra note
175, at 348.
189. Despite the problems created by multiple forums, only a few commentators
have discussed the reasons for the phenomenon. See M. SoVERN, supra note
59, at 91-93; Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, The Proper Role of Res Judicata
and Collateral Estoppel in Title VII Suits, 79 Mic. L REV. 1485, 1493-97 (1981)
[hereinafter referred to as Proper Role ]; Purdy, Title VI." Relationships and
Effect of State Action, 7 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L REV. 525 (1966); Comment, En-
forcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. Cm. L.
REv. 430, 442-43 (1965); Note, Discrimination in Employment and in Housing:
Private Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1968, 82
H v. L. REV. 834, 843-44 & n.55 (1969).
190. See supra note 161 and accompanying text and infra notes 252 & 284 and ac-
companying text.
191. Title VI, § 706(c)-(d), 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-5(c)-(d) (1976). See also Title VII,
§ 709(b), 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-8(b) (1976). A full discussion of the interrelation-
ship between Title VII and the state and local antidiscrimination laws in Ne-
braska will appear in Part Two of this Article.
192. 110 CONG. REc. 12725 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). In addition to pre-
serving local expertise and experience, initial resort to state agencies was in-
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ized that in "many areas effective [local] enforcement is hampered
by inadequate legislation, inadequate procedures, or an inade-
quate budget."19 3 Thus, Title VII preserved access ,to the federal
courts under federal law.194
The Nebraska FEPA was a testament to the success of Title
VII's goal of encouraging local involvement, although not a particu-
larly admirable one. The Nebraska FEPA became law on August 3,
1965,195 shortly after Title VII became effective: 9 6
[T]he chief motive for State legislators to create a rights agency.., was
the desire to preempt the newly formed Federal agency.., from exercis-
ing direct jurisdiction in the State ....
[The legislators] wanted to create a "kept" agency, one that would
keep Federal agents out of the State and yet not become too concerned
with the rights of minorities. 197
The Nebraska FEPA's approach to local involvement mirrors
the approach of Title VII. An early attempt to totally cede state
authority to duly created city commissions was rejected.198 In-
stead, the NEOC may refer charges arising in a locality to a local
tended to increase public acceptance of equal employment opportunity
efforts, conserve federal resources, and provide opportunities for experimen-
tation. M. SovERN, supra note 59, at 92-93. See also Kremer v. Chemical Con-
str. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1892-93 (1982); 110 CONG. REc. 7214, 7216 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Clark); 110 CONG. REc. 7205 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark);
Proper Role, supra note 189, at 1493-97.
193. 110 CONG. REC. 7205 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Case). See also 110 CONG. REC.
13080-81 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark); 110 CONG. REc. 6549-50 (1964) (re-
marks of Sen. Humphrey); Proper Role, supra note 189, at 1493-97.
194. Title VII, § 706(c), (f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), (f) (1) (1976). See Proper
Role, supra note 189, at 1495-96 n.73.
195. 1965 Neb. Laws 782, 798.
196. Title VII went into effect on July 2, 1965, one year after the date of its enact-
ment. Title VII, Pub. L No. 88-352, § 716(a), 78 Stat. 257 (July 2, 1964).
197. 1975 NEBRASKA ADvIsORY COMM., supra note 57, at 8. See id. at 9-11; 1982 NE-
BRASKA ADvisoRY COmm., supra note 59, at 20. This view is certainly sup-
ported by remarks made in the floor debate:
I don't like new commissions ... but in sixteen days [Title VII] will
become the law of the land. ... [Y our choice is just this-do you
want the people of your own state to be on a commission to rule and
regulate this matter or do you want federal people to come in here
under federal laws and federal inspections of all kinds and FBI
agents to come in here to enforce the law.
Floor Debate on L.B. 656, at 1990 (June 14, 1965) (remarks of Sen. Klauer).
See also Floor Debate on L.B. 656, at 1987 (June 14, 1965) (remarks of Sen.
Batchelder); Floor Debate on L.B. 656, at 1988 (June 14, 1965) (remarks of
Sen. Danner); Floor Debate on L.B. 656, at 1989 (June 14, 1965) (remarks of
Sen. Carpenter); Floor Debate on L.B. 656, at 1989-90 (June 14, 1965) (remarks
of Sen. Mahoney); Floor Debate on L.B. 656, at 1991 (June 14, 1965) (remarks
of Sen. Pederson); Floor Debate on LB. 656, at 1992 (June 14, 1965) (remarks
of Sen. Batchelder).
198. LB. 656, § 11(3), 75th Leg., 1st Sess., 1965 NEB. LEGIS. J. 339 (Feb. 1, 1965),
enacted later in amendedform, 1965 Neb. Laws 782. Compare the proposals
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agency and is authorized to take further action only if it deter-
mines that the local agency has not acted promptly or suffi-
ciently.199 Thus, the Nebraska FEPA encourages local
involvement by authorizing referral, but retains state agency re-
view to ensure an appropriate response to a statewide concern.200
The application of preclusion rules becomes complex in this
context. The tension causing the creation of multiple forums cuts
in opposite directions. If local fact-finding precludes later state
fact-finding, local involvement would be encouraged. Localities
would have a great deal of power in regulating employment dis-
crimination. On the other hand, such preclusion would largely un-
dercut the state's ability to review local actions to ensure an
appropriate statewide response.
Multiple forums in employment discrimination cases may also
be intended to further conciliation. Conciliation is a required step
in the procedure of every employment discrimination law in Ne-
braska.201 Voluntary settlement is preferred;202 it avoids disrup-
tion and saves time and resources. Strong preclusion rules may
conflict with the policy of conciliation. An employer faced with a
hearing on a discrimination claim which would preclude all subse-
quent hearings may be less willing to voluntarily settle than an
employer faced with hearings in multiple forums. "[T] he threat of
having to account to two agencies may induce businessmen and
labor leaders to arrange to deal with only one."203
Finally, multiple forums may be an attempt to provide broadly
based remedies for a high priority problem:
In [Title VII], Congress indicated that it considered the policy against dis-
crimination to be of the "highest priority." Consistent with this view, Title
VII provides for consideration of employment discrimination claims in
several forums. And, in general, submission of a claim to one forum does
not preclude a later submission to another.
2 0 4
Thus, multiple forums may be intended to emphasize the impor-
to make Title VII inapplicable in states that were enforcing adequate fair em-
ployment practices laws. 110 CONG. REc. 2727, 2828 (1964).
199. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-113 (Supp. 1982). But see supra notes 148-55 and accom-
panying text (actual NEOC practice differs).
200. It should be noted that NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-113 (Supp. 1982), was enacted in
1969 by a different legislature than initially enacted the Nebraska FEPA. 1969
Neb. Laws 544.
201. Title VII, § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-118(1)
(1978); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-142 (1980); LINcoLN, NEB., MUN. CODE
§ 11.02.040(c) (8) (1980); GRAND ISLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-10(b) (1981).
202. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) ("Coopera-
tion and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means for
achieving [the] goal [of equal employment opportunity].").
203. Comment, supra note 189, at 442. See also Note, supra note 189, at 843.
204. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1974) (citations omit-
ted). See also Smouse v. General Elec. Co., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
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tance of the issue and to facilitate an effective resolution of the
problem.
3. Preclusion in Employment Discrimination Cases in
Nebraska
In what circumstances should a complainant be prohibited
from pursuing an employment discrimination claim or issue be-
cause of the preclusion doctrines? Although the effect of claim and
issue preclusion on a complainant's case will often be the same in
an employment discrimination case,2 05 the two types of preclusion
must be dealt with separately since they entail different
considerations.
a. Claim Preclusion
Claim preclusion prohibits relitigation of the same cause of ac-
tion.20 6 Thus, if a complainant who has charged and lost under the
Nebraska FEPA is pursuing the same cause of action when she
files a charge under the Lincoln FEPO, claim preclusion would
apply.
31,165 (3rd Cir. 1980); City of Chicago v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Connm'n, 23 EmpL Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,276 (M. App. Ct. 1980).
205. Where the state and local issues are the same, claim and issue preclusion will
have the same effect on a complainant's case. For example, assume a com-
plainant pursues race and sex discrimination claims in state court under the
Nebraska FEPA. The complainant loses on both claims and commences a
proceeding under the Lincoln FEPO alleging race and sex discrimination. If
preclusion principles apply, both claim and issue preclusion would prevent
the complainant from relitigating her race and sex discrimination claims.
Where the state and local issues are different, the distinction between
claim and issue preclusion takes on significance. For example, assume our
complainant pursues only her race discrimination claim in state court under
the Nebraska FEPA. She loses and commences a proceeding under the Lin-
coln FEPO alleging sex discrimination. If preclusion principles apply, issue
preclusion would not prevent the complainant from pursuing her sex dis-
crimination claim. Issue preclusion only prevents relitigation of issues that
were actually litigated in a prior proceeding. See supra note 160 and accom-
panying text. Claim preclusion, however, would prevent litigation of the sex
discrimination claim. Claim preclusion prevents relitigation of claims that
were or could have been raised in the prior action. See supra note 159 and
accompanying text.
Prior and subsequent lawsuits involving employment discrimination often
raise the same issues; as a result, claim and issue preclusion often have the
same effect on the subsequent lawsuit. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883 (1982); Moosavi v. Fairfax County Bd. of Educ., 666 F.2d
58 (4th Cir. 1981); Sinicropi v. Nassau Co., 601 F.2d 60 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 983 (1979).
206. Gaspor v. Flott, 209 Neb. 260, 263, 307 N.W.2d 500, 502 (1981); Norlanco, Inc. v.
County of Madison, 186 Neb. 100, 106-07, 181 N.W.2d 119, 123 (1970). See RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17, 24 (1982).
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The Restatement (Second) of Judgments defines a cause of ac-
tion as a "transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of
which the action arose."207 It goes on to say that what constitutes a
transaction or series of transactions is to be determined pragmati-
cally.208 This broad interpretation of cause of action, which leads
to a broad application of claim preclusion, assumes a modem pro-
cedural system which liberally permits the consolidation of vari-
ous substantive or remedial theories relating to a transaction in
one lawsuit.20 9 With such a procedural system, the parties should
be encouraged to resolve all issues arising out of a transaction in a
single proceeding.
Our employment discrimination complainant, then, is pursuing
the same transaction, or cause of action, in both the state and local
forums. 210 The complainant's charges arise out of the same "life-
situation."2 11 The substantive provisions of the state statute and
local ordinance are virtually identical.212 The facts are the same,
as are the relevant witnesses and proofs. 2 13
Despite this, claim preclusion should not prohibit our employ-
ment discrimination complainant from pursuing a local charge af-
ter her state charge has been rejected. As noted, the basis of broad
preclusion rules is a procedural system which liberally permits the
consolidation of various substantive and remedial theories. 214 The
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982). This definition of
cause of action is very broad. Id. at § 24 comment a ("[Cause of action,] in
the context of res judicata, has never been broader than the transaction to
which it related."). Indeed, it may be broader than the definition currently
favored by the Nebraska Supreme Court. Gaspor v. Flott, 209 Neb. 260, 263,
307 N.W.2d 500, 502 (1981) (espousing a "primary right" definition of cause of
action). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment a (1982)
(number of primary rights irrelevant under transactional approach). See
also Vantage Enter., Inc. v. Caldwell, 196 Neb. 671, 675-76, 244 N.W.2d 678, 681
(1976). Nevertheless, I consider only the transactional approach. The trans-
actional approach provides the broadest claim preclusion. I conclude that,
even under this approach, claim preclusion should not apply to multi-forum
employment discrimination claims in Nebraska. Consequently, claim preclu-
sion should not apply afortiori under any of the more restrictive approaches
to claim preclusion.
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2) (1982).
209. Vantage Enter., Inc. v. Caldwell, 196 Neb. 671, 677-78, 680, 244 N.W.2d 678, 682-
83 (1976). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment a (1982).
210. I am assuming here a complainant who is pursuing the same alleged act of
discrimination in both state and local forums.
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment a (1982).
212. See supra note 11.
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment b (1982).
214. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 26(a) (c) (1982) ("[Claim preclusion does not apply where]
plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case.., in the first
action because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the
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procedural system for resolving employment discrimination
claims does not do that.215 The complainant cannot consolidate
her claims before a single tribunal. She cannot file or pursue a
claim under the Lincoln FEPO before the NEOC, nor can she file
or pursue a claim under the Nebraska FEPA before the Lincoln
Commission.216 Claim preclusion simply does not apply to a claim.
that could not have been raised in the prior tribunal.217
courts or restrictions on their authority to entertain multiple theories. ..
id. at § 26(1) ("[Claim preclusion does not apply where] it is the sense of the
[statutory] scheme that the plaintiff should be permitted to split his claim.").
See generally Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. Director, Of-
fice of Workers' Compensation Programs, 583 F.2d 1273, 1278 (4th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 (1979); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Nix, 512
F.2d 125, 131 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Pan-American Petroleum Co., 55
F.2d 753, 776-83 (9th Cir. 1932).
215. Instead, the procedural system for resolving employment discrimination
claims contains multiple overlapping and independent remedies. See Electri-
cal Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 236-39 (1976); Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-61 (1975); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-49 (1974).
216. Generally, the state and local commissions are authorized to accept and re-
solve charges only under the law they are charged to administer. See NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 48-1117 to 48-1119 (1978 & Supp. 1982); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE
§§ 13-122, 13-128 (1980); LINCoLN, NEB., MuN. CODE § 11.02.040 (1980); GRAND
ISLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-8 (1981). In a similar fashion, courts may not
review under one statutory scheme claims brought before them under an-
other statutory scheme, unless the charging party has exhausted the admin-
istrative procedures under the prior scheme. There are no reported cases in
which such exhaustion has occurred and a court has considered a state and
local claim simultaneously. Moreover, the state and local laws clearly do not
contemplate such a simultaneous consideration. Review under the Nebraska
FEPA is to be based on the record developed before the NEOC, NEB. REV.
STAT. § 48-1120(3) (1978), and review under the local ordinances is usually
based on the record developed before the local commission. See supra notes
128 & 135 and accompanying text. Neither the state law nor the local ordi-
nances instruct a court on the proper record for judicial review where both
state and local claims are raised in one proceeding.
217. See Gaspor v. Flott, 209 Neb. 260,263,307 N.W.2d 500, 502 (1981); Norlanco, Inc.
v. County of Madison, 186 Neb. 100, 106, 181 N.W.2d 119, 123 (1970) ("[Claim
preclusion extends to] matters actually determined [and] to other matters
which properly could have been raised and determined .... ).
The majority rule in the federal courts is also that claim preclusion applies
only to claims that could have been raised in the prior proceeding. See, e.g.,
Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968); Hayes v.
Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 984 (5th Cir. 1979); Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk
Co., 383 F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir. 1967); Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997 (9th
Cir. 1975). However, there is contrary authority. See Nash County Bd. of
Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 487-93 (4th Cir. 1981). Cf. Marrese v.
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1982),
vacated, 1982-3 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,214 (7th Cir. 1983), reconsidered, 1983-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,365 (7th Cir. 1983) (in its original decision, the Court
discussed a claim preclusion issue and applied Nash; in its reconsideration,




Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of an issue that was actu-
ally litigated and determined in a prior action.2 18 In employment
discrimination cases, there are determinations at various points in
the process: the administrative agency makes a reasonable cause
determination, the agency renders a decision after an administra-
tive hearing, and a court makes a ruling after review of the admin-
istrative hearing. This section will consider whether issue
preclusion should apply at each of these points.
(i) Reasonable Cause Determinations
The state and local procedures all require administrative agen-
cies to make a reasonable cause determination early in the
processing of a charge.2 19 The reasonable cause determination
comes after an investigation by the agency, but before any adver-
sarial hearing.220 The determination is roughly analogous to a de-
cision to prosecute.
Issue preclusion should not apply to a reasonable cause deter-
mination. Issue preclusion should apply only where there has
been a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.22 1 A reason-
able cause determination comes before the parties have had any
opportunity to litigate. It is intentionally a preliminary and tenta-
tive conclusion.222
filed an antitrust action in state court under a state statute that was identical
to the Sherman Act, a federal antitrust statute. The plaintiff lost and subse-
quently ified an action based on the same transaction in federal court under
the Sherman Act. The Court held that claim preclusion applied, even though
the plaintiff could not have raised the Sherman Act claim in state court.
Nash, 640 F.2d at 487-93.
It is unlikely that the Nebraska Supreme Court will adopt Nash's liberal
interpretation of claim preclusion. If it does, however, claim preclusion may
apply where the Nebraska FEPA and a local ordinance would apply identi-
cally, or very similarly, to a claimant's cause of action. See Marrese, 692 F.2d
at 1091-92. Even in that situation, though, claim preclusion may not apply for
the reasons discussed later in this Article. See infra notes 221-227, 239-57 &
284-90 and accompanying text.
218. JED Constr. Co. v. Lilly, 208 Neb. 607, 611-12, 305 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1981); Peterson
v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 204 Neb. 136, 139, 281 N.W.2d 525, 527 (1979). See
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
219. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1118(1) (Supp. 1982); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 13-141,
13-142 (1980); LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.060 (1980); GRAND ISLAND,
NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-10 (1981).
220. See supra note 219.
221. JED Constr. Co. v. Lilly, 208 Neb. 607, 611-12, 305 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1981); Peterson
v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 204 Neb. 136, 139, 281 N.W.2d 525, 527 (1979). See
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 & n.11 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5) (c) (1982).
222. Reasonable cause determinations are designed to allocate resources. The
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In addition, issue preclusion should not apply to reasonable
cause determinations because it would undermine conciliation ef-
forts. Conciliation is a central goal of all employment discrimina-
tion procedures in Nebraska.223 Reasonable cause determinations
come before the conciliation effort.22 4 To the extent the reasonable
cause determination would bind all secondary tribunals, 2 25 it
would lessen incentives to voluntarily settle the case.226
Issue preclusion, then, should not apply to reasonable cause
determinations. 227
(ii) Determinations Made After Administrative Hearings
The state and local procedures, except in Grand Island,228 con-
template an agency determination after an administrative hear-
ing.229 A' proceeding may be abandoned after the agency
determination, but before judicial review. If issue preclusion ap-
plies, the agency proceeding in such circumstances would be con-
clusive on the parties in any subsequent collateral proceeding.
The determinations of administrative agencies may, under cer-
tain circumstances, be given preclusive effect.230 Thus, a claim of
agency conducts an ex parte investigation to determine if the facts warrant a
conciliation attempt and further proceedings. A determination of reasonable
cause contemplates further proceedings; it is not, and is not intended to be,
final. A determination of no reasonable cause is, in effect, a decision not to
invest additional public funds in the proceeding.
223. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 219.
225. A reasonable cause determination does not bind the primary tribunal. An
NEOC finding of reasonable cause, for example, does not require the NEOC
to find a violation of the Nebraska FEPA after a public hearing. It would be
anomalous to bind secondary tribunals by a decision which has such a lim-
ited effect on the primary tribunal.
226. See supra note 202-03 and accompanying text.
227. The reasons discussed for not applying issue preclusion to determinations
made after an administrative hearing or after judicial review could also be
applied to reasonable cause determinations. See infra notes 239-57 and ac-
companying text.
228. The Grand Island FEPO authorizes the Grand Island Commission to file a
civil action in district court if conciliation fails. GRAND IsLAND, NEB., MuN.
CODE § 37-14 (1981).
229. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1119 (1979); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 13-156 to 13-171
(1980); LUCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.070 (1980).
230. "When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves
disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an ade-
quate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judi-
cata to enforce repose." United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S.
394, 421-22 (1966). See Fisher v. Housing Authority, 214 Neb. 499, 506-07, -
N.W.2d - (1983); Schilke v. School Dist. No. 107, 207 Neb. 448, 451, 299 N.W.2d
527, 530 (1980); Richardson v. Board of Educ., 206 Neb. 18, 26, 290 N.W.2d 803,
809 (1980); Ohmart v. Dennis, 188 Neb. 260, 263-64, 196 N.W.2d 181, 184 (1972);
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issue preclusion cannot be met with the broad assertion that ad-
ministrative determinations are not worthy of preclusive effect.23 1
Rather, the defense must be more narrowly circumscribed. In this
setting, the adequacy of the procedures utilized before the admin-
istrative agency 232 and the policies of the statutory scheme must
be considered.233
The procedures utilized before the antidiscrimination agencies
in Nebraska are generally sufficient to justify the application of is-
sue preclusion. Charging parties and respondents are adequately
notified of the proceedings.234 They can present issues through
pleadings and briefs.235 They are afforded discovery rights compa-
rable to those in civil cases. 2 36 They are given the opportunity to
present evidence and argument on their behalf and to rebut evi-
dence and argument presented by opposing parties.237 There is a
point in the proceedings when presentations are concluded and a
decision is rendered.238
Christensen v. Boss, 179 Neb. 429, 438, 138 N.W.2d 716, 721 (1965). See also
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1899 n.26 (1982); United
Farm Workers v. Arizona Agr. Employment, 669 F.2d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir. 1982);
Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 1321-22 (7th Cir. 1978); Snow v. Nevada
Dep't. of Prisons, 543 F. Supp. 752, 755 (D. Nev. 1982). See generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 (1982); Groner & Sternstein, Res Judicata
in Federal Administrative Law, 39 IowA L REv. 300, 316 (1954) ("technically
the rule remains: there will be no re-trial of issues which were fully litigated
as between the same parties and finally disposed of by a competent tribunal.
The rule is applicable in administrative law cases...").
231. In discussing the issue of the preclusive effect to be given administrative de-
cisions, one comftnentator has identified the issue as follows: "What sort of
decisions have that element of quality or dignity which is essential to make
them the basis for a plea of res judicata in subsequent controversies?" Gris-
wold, supra note 162, at 1322.
232. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(2) (1982).
233. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(3)-(4) (1982).
234. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1119(1) (1978); Rule 3-6, NEOC, 6 NEB. ADMIN. R. 3-4
(1977); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-156 to § 13-157 (1980); OMAHA BD. RULES
ch. 5, rule 1-3 (1981); LiNCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.070(a) (1980); LU coLN
RULES, rule 4-4(b) (1982).
235. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1119(1) (1978); Rule 3-4(e), NEOC, 6 NEB. ADmIN. R. 3-2
(1977); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-159 (1980); OMAHA BD. RULES ch. 5, rule
5-11(a) (1981); LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.070(d) (1980); LINcoLN
RULES, rule 5-12 (1982).
236. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1117 (Supp. 1982); Rule 5-1, NEOC, 6 NEB. ADMEN. R. 5-1
(1975); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-161 (1980); OMAHA BD. RULES ch. 5, rule
5-6 (1981); LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.070(d) (1980); LINCOLN RULES,
rule 5-11 (1982).
237. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1119(1) (1978); Rule 3-4(e), NEOC, 6 NEB. ADMIN. 3-2
(1977); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-136 (1980); OMAHA BD. RULES ch. 5, rules
4-6(b), 4-6(d) (1981); LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.070(d) (1980); LINCOLN
RULES, rule 5-3 (1982).
238. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-119(3) (1978); Rule 3-8(a), NEOC, 6 NEB. ADjmN. 3-5
(1977); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 13-142,13-141 (1980); OMAHA BD. RULES ch.
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The Omaha FEPO, however, presents two possible roadblocks
to the application of issue preclusion to determinations of the
Omaha Commission. Both roadblocks arise because the Director
prosecutes the action and is a formal party to the proceeding; 39
the charging party "may be allowed to intervene, present oral tes-
timony or other evidence and examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses.1240 If the charging party does not become a party to the
proceeding, issue preclusion may not apply against the charging
party (1) because of her lack of control over the proceedings and
(2) because of her inability to appeal an adverse determination.
A non-party to a prior proceeding can be precluded in a subse-
quent proceeding if she had a sufficient measure of control over
the prior proceeding.2 41 '"The measure of control by a nonparty
that justifies preclusion ... is essentially a matter of fact, to be
determined by looking for that measure of 'practical control' that
makes it fair to impose preclusion."242 Although the particular
5, rule 7-1 (1981); LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.070(e), (f) (1980); LINCOLN
RULES, rule 9-1 (1982).
239. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 13-157, 13-159 (1980); OMAHA BD. RULES ch. 5,
rules 4-4(a), 4-6(a) (1981).
240. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-159 (1980) (emphasis added); OMAHA BD.
RULES ch. 5, rule 4-4(b) (1981).
241. See, e.g., Hickman v. Southwest Dairy Suppliers, Inc., 194 Neb. 17, 230 N.W.2d
99 (1975); Vincent v. Peter Pan Bakers, Inc., 182 Neb. 206, 153 N.W.2d 849
(1967); Metcalf v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 176 Neb. 468, 126 N.W.2d 471
(1964); Independent Elevators v. Davis, 116 Neb. 397, 217 N.W. 577 (1928). See
also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 39-42 (1982). See generally Strom & Strom, Issue Pre-
clusion and the Concept of Privity, 15 CREIGHTON 1. REV. 117, 123-25 (1981);
Comment, Mutuality of Estoppe" Its Status in Nebraska, 45 NEB. L. REV. 613,
616-17 (1966).
Traditionally, this issue would be addressed in terms of privity. See, e.g.,
Schurman v. Pegau, 136 Neb. 628, 636-37, 286 N.W. 921, 925-26 (1939); MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 158, at 0.411 [ 1]; Strom & Strom, supra, at 123-
24. Privity, however, is often not a useful concept, particularly in the area of
non-party preclusion. See Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950) ("Privity ... is merely a word used to
say that the relationship between the one who is a party on the record and
another is close enough to include that other within the res judicata.");
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 158, 1 0.411[6, at 1553. The current
trend is to reject the privity nomenclature in favor of more precise descrip-
tions of the relations that might lead to preclusion. Montana v. United States,
440 U.S. 147,154 n.5 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1 intro-
duction, at 1, 13-14 (1982); id. at §§ 34-61 (rejects privity nomenclature);
George, supra note 183, at 657; Comment, The Expanding Scope of the Res
Judicata Bar, 54 TEx. L. REV. 527, 537 (1976). This Article will follow that
trend.
242. FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 158, § 4451, at 429-30. Compare Hickman v.
Southwest Dairy Suppliers, Inc., 194 Neb. 17, 230 N.W.2d 99 (1975) and
Schorman v. Pegau, 136 Neb. 628, 636-37, 286 N.W. 921, 925-26 (1939) with Met-
calf v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 176 Neb. 468,126 N.W.2d 471 (1964) and
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facts will have a bearing on the resolution of this issue, in most
cases a charging party who is a non-party to the adjudicatory hear-
ing should have a sufficient measure of control to justify preclu-
sion. The charging party certainly has a sufficient interest in the
proceeding; the Director is prosecuting the action on behalf of the
charging party. The charging party has conclusive, negative con-
trol over the proceedings; there are no limits on the withdrawal of
a charge.243 In addition, the charging party has substantial control
over the prosecution of the charge; in most cases, the prosecution
will be fueled by the charging party's testimony and the other in-
formation she is able to supply.244 Finally, it can be argued that
the charging party has been given an opportunity to participate as
a party245 and, consequently, it is not unfair to bind her.246
The second possible roadblock arises because only parties to
the Omaha Commission proceeding may appeal the Commission's
determination.247 If a non-party complainant loses before the
Omaha Commission, it would be unfair to bind her to a decision
Independent Elevators v. Davis, 116 Neb. 397, 217 N.W. 517 (1928). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 39 (1982); MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE, supra note 158, at 0.41[6].
243. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
244. Cf. Checker Taxi Co. v. National Prod. Worker's Union, 507 F. Supp. 971 (N.D.
Ill. 1981) (action before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) brought
on behalf of charging party by NLRB Regional Director did not preclude later
action brought by charging party).
245. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-159 (1980); OMAHA BD. RULES ch. 5, rule 4-4(b)
(1981).
246. Provident Tradesmen Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 114 (1968)
(preclusion should apply to one who has "purposely bypassed an adequate
opportunity to intervene"); Metcalf v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 176
Neb. 468, 476, 126 N.W.2d 471, 476 (1964). See Comment, Nonparties and Pre-
clusion by Judgment: The Privity Rule Reconsidered, 56 CAL. L REV. 1098
(1968); Note, Preclusion of Absent Disputants to Compel Intervention, 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1551 (1979). Despite this, it is not generally accepted that a
non-party may be precluded solely because she bypassed an opportunity to
participate:
The law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a
hearing the burden of voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a
stranger .... Unless duly summoned to appear in a legal proceed-
ing, a person not a privy may rest assured that a judgment recovered
therein will not affect his legal rights.
Chase Nat'l Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 441 (1934). See also Gratiot
County State Bank v. Johnson, 249 U.S. 246, 249-50 (1919); Fabricius v. Free-
man, 466 F.2d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 1972). See generally FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 158, at § 4452.
247. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-199 (1980); OMAHA BD. RULES ch. 5, rule 3-1(a)
(1981). Although this is stated as a separate consideration because of its sep-
arate treatment in the literature, it could be viewed merely as a particular
limitation on a non-party's "practical control" that would make it unjust to




she could not appeal.248 This is particularly true where the quality
of the first tribunal is questionable 249 and where the overall statu-
tory enforcement scheme emphasizes the importance of judicial
review. 250 In this circumstance, the charging party's opportunity
to participate as a party, should not prejudice her right to judicial
review of her claim.25 1
The policies of the statutory enforcement scheme must also be
considered to determine the preclusive effect of administrative de-
terminations. If the enforcement scheme permits relitigation of
claims, the ordinary preclusion principles should not apply.2 52 The
Nebraska statutes indicate that the decisions of local tribunals
should not preclude state enforcement processes:
If the [NEOC] determines that a local agency is not handling a complaint
with reasonable promptness, or that the protection of the rights of the par-
ties or the interests of justice requires such action, the [NEOC] may
regain jurisdiction of the complaint and proceed to handle it in the same
manner as other complaints... .253
This Nebraska statute, then, contemplates rehearing a claim in a
state forum that has already been considered in a local forum.25 4
248. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1) (1982). See Dorsey v. Solo-
mon, 435 F. Supp. 725, 741-42 (D. Md. 1977), modified on other grounds, 604
F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1979).
249. Although the Restatement (Second) of Judgments indicates that issue preclu-
sion is never appropriate where review is unavailable, see supra note 248,
other commentators have indicated that "the availability of preclusion should
not turn on the absence of appeal alone, but should depend as well on the
nature of the first tribunal." FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 158, § 4434, at 321.
The quality of the Omaha Commission is questionable. It is composed of in-
terest group representatives, OMAHA, NEB., MtN. CODE § 13-124 (1980), many
or most of whom have no legal training and little experience in the highly
complex area of employment discrimination law.
250. See supra notes 113-36 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 246.
252. "An adjudicative determination of a claim by an administrative tribunal does
not preclude relitigation in another tribunal of the same or a related claim
based on the same transaction if the scheme of remedies permits assertion of
the second claim notwithstanding the adjudication of the first claim." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(3) (1982). See Pederson v. Wes-
troads, Inc., 189 Neb. 236, 240, 202 N.W.2d 198, 201 (1972); Lost Creek Drainage
Dist. v. Elsam, 188 Neb. 705, 708, 199 N.W.2d 387, 390 (1972). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(4) (1982); FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
158, § 4475, at 767-68. See generally Schopflocher, The Doctrine ofRes Judicata
in Administrative Law, 1942 Wis. L. REV. 198, 212 ("legislative intent as ex-
pressed in the enabling statute ought to be the touchstone for ascertaining
whether and to what extent an administrative decision has the effect of res
judicata").
253. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-113 (Supp. 1982).
254. It could be argued that the NEOC only has the power to rehear charges that
have initially been filed with the NEOC and then referred to a local agency.
Such a restrictive interpretation of the statute should be rejected. It would
create two classes of charges: charges initially fied with a local agency and
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The normal preclusion rules do not apply under the statute; rather,
the NEOC has the authority to decide whether to rehear a claim
based upon the statutory standards.255 Moreover, in directing the
NEOC to handle the claim "in the same manner" as other claims,
the statute undermines any claim of preclusion. Hearing a claim
"in the same manner" as other claims requires an initial decision
based upon a preponderance of the evidence standard25 6 and de
novo judicial review.25 7
The Nebraska statutes also provide that "the Legislature
desires to provide for the local enforcement and enactment of civil
rights legislation concurrent with the authority of the State of Ne-
braska. "258 This statute was enacted in response to Nebraska
Supreme Court opinions which said that the state had preempted
the field of employment discrimination and, consequently, that lo-
calities were without authority to act in the area.259 It can be ar-
gued, however, that the statute does more than merely counter
state preemption. State preemption could have been countered
without the addition of the italicized language. The italicized lan-
guage acquires independent meaning26 0 if the word "concurrent"
is interpreted to affect the application of preclusion doctrines. 26 1
charges initially filed with the NEOC. Decisions on the latter charges would
be subject to an unrestricted rehearing while decisions on the former charges
would have preclusive effect. There is no discernable rationale for such a
distinction and, moreover, the local decisions given preclusive effect under
such a scheme would undermine the state's supervisory rule in the antidis-
crimination effort. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
255. This interpretation of the Nebraska statutes is bolstered by the NEOC's regu-
lations. Rule 2-2(d) (2), NEOC, 6 NEB. ADnhm. R. 2-4 (1977), provides that the
NEOC "shall accord substantial weight to the final findings and orders" of the
local commissions. It would be anomalous to bind state courts to local deter-
minations that do not bind the NEOC. Cf. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.,
102 S. Ct. 1883, 1891 n.7 (1982) (it would be anomalous to bind federal courts to
state administrative decisions that do not bind the EEOC).
256. Rules 3-8(b) (iii) to 3-8(b) (v), NEOC, 6 NEB. AnMmN. R. 3-5 to 3-6 (1977).
257. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
258. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-113.01 (Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
259. City of Omaha Human Relations Dep't. v. City Wide Rock & Excavating Co.,
201 Neb. 405, 408, 268 N.W.2d 98, 101 (1978); Midwest Employers Council, Inc.
v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 877, 888, 131 N.W.2d 609, 616 (1964).
260. "It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that significance and effect
shall, if possible, be accorded to every word." Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S.
112, 115 (1879). See also Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 298
(1956) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
261. This interpretation of "concurrent" is somewhat persuasive because the word
appears in close proximity to other statutory language which exhibits legisla-
tive concern with the interrelationship of the state and local procedures.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-113 (Supp. 1982).
It could be argued that "concurrent" means concurrent in scope with the
Nebraska fair employment practices statutes. That interpretation, however,
would conflict with other statutory language which allows localities to enact
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That is, "concurrent" may mean that the local and state proce-
dures should be allowed to operate over the same subject matter at
the same time.26 2 The application of preclusion rules in the area
would result in procedures that were not operating concurrently
because then one procedure would preempt the other.263 Inter-
preted this way, the statute, in contrast to the earlier one,26 4 indi-
cates that preclusion should not operate either way: Local
decisions should not preclude later state determinations, nor
should state decisions preclude later local determinations. This
argument, however, should be rejected. Generally if two courts
have "concurrent" jurisdiction, "a judgment in either court will...
have complete res judicata effect in the other."265 Thus, charging
parties may resort in the first instance to either the state or local
agency, but once that choice is made, this statute does not alter
normal application of the preclusion rules.266
In summary, local agency determinations of employment dis-
crimination claims in Nebraska should not be given preclusion ef-
fect in subsequent state proceedings, but state agency
determinations on such claims should be given preclusive effect in
subsequent local proceedings. This interpretation of the Nebraska
statutes is supported by the rationale of multiple forums. The stat-
utes, if followed,267 encourage local involvement in the antidis-
laws "more comprehensive than" the state law. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-113
(Supp. 1982). This conflict is particularly unacceptable because the same leg-
islative bill, LB. 438, 1979 Neb. Laws 1225, contained both the "concurrent"
language and the "more comprehensive than" language, and because it is
unnecessary.
262. See Rogers v. Bonnett, 2 Okla. 553, 556, 37 P. 1078, 1079 (1894). See also, WEB-
STER'S NEW COLLEGMATE DICTIONARY 234 (1976).
263. Cf. State v. Stueve, 260 Iowa 10234, 1030-31, 150 N.W.2d 597, 602 (1967).
264. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-113 (Supp. 1982) indicates only that the decisions of local
tribunals should not preclude state enforcement processes. See supra note
254 and accompanying text.
265. Comment, supra note 161, at 1363.
266. See, e.g., Hercules fron Works v. Elgin J. & E. Ry. Co., 141 I1l. 491, 498, 30 N.W.
1050, 1051 (1892); In Re Nichols Will, 54 Okla. 241, 244, 166 P. 1087, 1090 (1917);
Murray v. Roanoke, 192 Va. 321, 327, 64 S.E.2d 804, 808 (1951).
267. But see supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text. The NEOC's failure to
follow the statute which directs it to refer charges received by it to local com-
missions, NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-113 (Supp. 1982), interferes with the scheme of
remedies in employment discrimination cases in Nebraska. If followed, the
statute would require all claims filed in jurisdictions with local commissions
to be heard initially by local commissions. The determinations made under
local law, however, would not have preclusive effect in subsequent state pro-
ceedings. See supra notes 252-57 and accompanying text. As a result, claims
may be heard under local law and then heard anew under state law. The
NEOC, though, does not follow the statute; it does not refer charges initially
filed with it to local commissions. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying
text. Determinations made under state law would preclude subsequent local
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crimination effort.268 The NEOC refers charges to local
agencies.269 The parties should take the local procedures seriously
because the state will only intervene if the NEOC makes the
specific findings required by the statute.270 At the same time, the
statute protects the state interest in the antidiscrimination ef-
fort.2 7 1 The state can flexibly intervene 27 2 if the local commissions
do not pursue claims with sufficient vigor.27 3 In addition, the rela-
tive freedom from preclusion rules furthers the conciliation and
multiple remedy rationales for multiple forums. 2 74
(iii) State Court Decisions
The state and local procedures all contemplate a judicial hear-
ing. Under the Nebraska FEPA,275 Omaha FEPO,276 and Lincoln
FEPO,277 a court may review the record made before and the de-
termination made by an administrative agency. Under the Grand
proceedings. As a result, the statutory scheme of remedies, which contem-
plates consideration under both local and state law without limitation by pre-
clusion rules, is perverted. Instead, consideration can often be obtained only
under state law and preclusion prevents consideration under local law.
268. See supra notes 191-92 & 199-200 and accompanying text.
269. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-113 (Supp. 1982).
270. The NEOC's explicit authority to reconsider local decisions gives rise to a
related argument against the application of issue preclusion. The application
of issue preclusion would render the NEOC's authority to reconsider mean-
ingless and, hence, frustrate the legislative intent.
271. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
272. That is, the state could intervene without being precluded by a local decision.
273. In a similar fashion, it may be that a state's enforcement procedures are
"hampered by inadequate legislation, inadequate procedures, or an inade-
quate budget." 110 CONG. REc. 7205 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Case). See supra
notes 192-93. Localities in Nebraska, for example, have acted more quickly,
see Midwest Employers Council, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 877, 131
N.W.2d 609 (1964), and more comprehensively, see supra notes 28-35 and ac-
companying text, to address the employment discrimination problem. The
arguable, but rejected, interpretation of the "concurrent" language would al-
low local commissions to intervene with effective enforcement if the state
commission was not pursuing claims with sufficient vigor.
This analysis recognizes that state and local policies on employment dis-
crimination may not be identical. The state, or the locality, may have a
broader, more encompassing policy against employment discrimination.
Where this is the case, the normal preclusion rules should not apply. See
Comment, supra note 161, at 1374-76.
274. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
275. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-1120 (1978). See supra notes 113-23 and accompanying
text.
276. OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 13-199 to 13-201 (1980). See supra notes 124-29
and accompanying text.




Island FEPO, the hearing itself takes place before the court.278 Is-
sue preclusion most commonly applies to judicial decisions.279 In
this area, the question is whether an issue decided by a court
under one enforcement scheme should preclude subsequent deci-
sions on that issue under another enforcement scheme.
The general rule of issue preclusion articulated by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court is:
[Issue preclusion] may be applied if the identical issue was decided in a
prior action, there was a judgment on the merits which was final, the party
against whom the rule is to be applied was a party or in privity with a
party to the prior action, and there was an opportunity to fully and fairly
litigate the issue in the prior action.280
If this rule is applied in employment discrimination cases, an issue
decided by a court under one enforcement scheme would preclude
subsequent decisions on that issue under another enforcement
scheme. For example, assume that the issue in both cases is the
same281 and that the court in the prior action issued a final judg-
ment on the merits. If the prior action were under the Nebraska
FEPA or the Lincoln FEPO, both the charging party and the re-
spondent would have been parties. If the prior action were under
the Omaha FEPO or Grand Island FEPO, the respondent would
have been a party and the charging party, in all probability, would
have had a sufficient measure of practical control to be bound.282
Finally, all of the procedures provide an opportunity to fully and
fairly litigate the issue.283
The normal application of the rule of issue preclusion in em-
ployment discrimination cases, however, is partially overridden by
statute.284 The Legislature, as noted above,285 gave the NEOC ex-
278. GRAND IsLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-14 (1981). See supra note 136 and ac-
companying text.
279. See Griswold, supra note 162, at 1322 ("Res judicata is a function of the judi-
cial process.").
280. Peterson v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 204 Neb. 136, 139, 281 N.W.2d 525, 527
(1979). See also, Reeves v. Watkins, 208 Neb. 804, 810-11, 305 N.W.2d 815, 819
(1981); JED Constr. Co. v. Lilly, 208 Neb. 607, 611, 305 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1981); Bor-
land v. Gillespie, 206 Neb. 191, 198, 292 N.W.2d 26, 31 (1980).
281. For example, let us assume that the determinative issue is whether an em-
ployer refused to hire an applicant because of her sex.
282. See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text. The Grand Island FEPO pro-
vides a full and fair opportunity to litigate in state court. GRAND IsLAND, NEB.,
MUN. CODE § 37-14 (1981).
284. Public policies, particularly public policies expressed through statutes, can
override the normal application of issue and claim preclusion. Mercoid Corp.
v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Kalb v. Feverstein, 308 U.S. 433,
444 (1940); Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 326, 332
(D.C. Cir. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). See supra note
252. See generally MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 158, at 10.405 [11].
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plicit authority to rehear local determinations. 286 The NEOC's au-
thority is not limited to local determinations that have not been
judicially reviewed.2 87 To the contrary, the authority is expressed
in expansive and broad terms. 288 It simply would not make sense
for the Legislature to direct the NEOC to rehear local complaints
"if the interests of justice" require a rehearing, and at the same
time make the local determination binding upon the NEOC.289
In this area, then, the Legislature has indicated that the normal
rules of issue preclusion should not apply to judicial decisions
under local fair employment practice ordinances. 290 Judicial deci-
sions under state law, however, should have preclusive effect; such
preclusion is not overridden by statute.291
But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 27-29, 83-84, 86 (1982) (pub-
lic policies do not override preclusion principles in normal situation).
285. See supra notes 253-57 and accompanying text.
286. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-113 (Supp. 1982). See supra notes 256-57 and accompany-
ing text.
287. The NEOC's authority is not so limited even though the Unicameral knew
that local determinations were subject to judicial review and even though it
would have been very easy to exempt local determinations that had been ju-
dicially reviewed.
288. The NEOC has the authority to rehear a claim initially referred to local agen-
cies if the "local agency is not handling [the] complaint with reasonable
promptness, or... the protection of the rights of the parties or the interests
of justice require ... such action." NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-113 (Supp. 1982).
289. It could be argued that the inapplicability of issue preclusion does not make
sense because it may result in the same state court hearing the same claim
twice. Decisions of the Omaha Commission and the NEOC, for example, may
both be reviewed in the District Court for Douglas County. This is not as
anomalous as it may seem at first glance. The judicial review would be based
on different records and would apply different standards of review.
290. There are additional reasons for not applying issue preclusion to judicially
reviewed determinations of the Omaha Board. If the charging party is not a
party to the lawsuit and consequently cannot appeal an adverse decision, is-
sue preclusion should not apply against the charging party in a subsequent
proceeding. See supra notes 247-51 and accompanying text. See also GRAND
ISLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-14 (1981) (court action brought by "commission
on behalf of the complainant"); supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. In
addition, the scope of review of Omaha Commission decisions is more restric-
tive than the scope of review of NEOC decisions. See supra notes 128-29 and
accompanying text. As a result a person who loses before the Omaha Com-
mission and cannot have the Commission's determination overturned in
court, should not be bound by the adverse court decision upon judicial review
of an NEOC decision. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (1982)
("[Issue preclusion should not apply where the] party against whom preclu-
sion is sought had a significantly heavier burden of persuasion with respect
to the issue in the initial action than in the subsequent action.").
291. See supra notes 258-66 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The procedural labyrinth in employment discrimination cases
is quite complex. This Article has demonstrated the complexity of
the relationship between the state and local antidiscrimination
procedures in Nebraska. The sequel, to appear in a subsequent
issue of the Nebraska Law Review, will uncover even more com-
plexity by discussing Title VII, the federal antidiscrimination law,
and its interrelationship with the Nebraska laws. The sequel will
also discuss procedural strategy in employment discrimination
cases in Nebraska.
